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Beyond Jaffee v. Redmond: Should the Federal
Courts Recognize a Right to Physician-Patient
Confidentiality?
STEPHEN AARON SILVER*
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows the federal courts to
develop evidentiary privileges that will bar the introduction of certain evidence
at trial. In Jaffee v. Redmond, the United States Supreme Court recognized a
psychotherapist-patient privilege for the first time. This Note argues that
technological advancements and changes in the nature of the physician-patient
relationship have made many of the ethical concerns identified by the Court in
Jaffee increasingly relevant to the doctor-patient relationship generally.
Following the Court's logic in Jaffee, the federal courts should recognize a
similar evidentiary privilege to protect at least some communications between
medical patients and their physicians.
"If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold. "I
"Ifyou ask how [one] is to know when one interest outweighs another,
I can only answer... from experience and study and reflection;
in brief from life itself "2
I. INTRODUCTION
The physician's duty to protect the confidences of his or her patients is an
ancient and time-honored tradition, essential to the well-being of the patient and
the integrity of the profession. The systematic medical process of listening to
the patient's complaints, diagnosing the problem, and performing a clinical
examination, which dates back to ancient Egypt,3 requires the patient to be
completely open with his or her doctor in order to facilitate an accurate
understanding of the disorder. A recognition of the medical professional's
responsibility to maintain his or her patient's confidences from damaging public
disclosure-even in defiance of the law-dates to biblical times.4 Among all the
* This Note is dedicated to the memory of Samuel R. Silver, and in honor of Phoebe
Silver-my Dad and Mom. I would also like to thank Ruth and Joe Starr, Marsha and Fred
Kom, Samuel Tobor, and all of my family and friends for their love and support.
1 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmatn, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 BEAMIN N. CAhmozo, THE NATURE OFTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921).
3 See MEDIcINE: A ThEAsUY oF ART AND LrrEATuRE 29 (Ann 0. Charmichael &
Richard M. Ratzan eds., 1991).
4 See, e.g., Exodus 1:15-22.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURWAL
writings in history concerning medicine and the medical profession, the most
famous and influential is the so-called "Hippocratic Oath," the physician's code
of ethics attributed to the medical school founded by the great Hellenic
physician Hippocrates of Cos (460-390 B.C.E.). The Hippocratic Oath
declares:
I swear by Apollo the Physician... that I will keep this Oath and this
Covenant to the best of my ability and judgement....
Whatever I see or hear concerning the lives of men during the practice of
my profession, or even outside of it, I will not divulge, guarding these things as
religious secrets.5
This oath is still taken today by every physician in the United States upon
entering the medical profession.
Today, as we enter the so-called "information age," the protection of
medical records and confidential communications between patient and doctor
from compelled disclosure is more important than ever before. The desire of
insurance companies and health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") to
control costs, the increasing influence of potential health care costs in hiring
decisions, the Human Genome Project and the rapid advancement in our ability
to read an individual's genetic code and predict the future course of his or her
life, 6 and the rapid increase in technology related to compiling, storing, and
communicating information all suggest the need to protect such deeply personal
and potentially damaging information from public disclosure when the need for
such information is less than compelling to the interests of justice. To date,
most states have reached a conclusion along these lines and have provided
statutory protection for physician-patient communications. 7 However, the
5 Greek Medical Ethics-The Hippocratic Oath: From the Corpus Medicorm.
Graecomum, in ANcIENT GRE:cE: DOCUMENTARY PERSPECnIvES 262-63 (Stylianos V.
Spyridakis & Bradley P. Nystrom eds., 1985).
6 The Human Genome Project is an ongoing, federally-supported project designed to
map out all of the different genes found in human beings (a total estimated at between 50,000
and 100,000 genes) so as to understand their roles in disease, development, and behavior. For
a comprehensive study of the history, goals, and socio-ethical issues involved in the Project,
see THm CODE OF CODES: SCmNTIC AND SOCIAL Issums IN THE HUMAN GENoME PRoracr
(Daniel J. Kevies & Leroy Hood eds., 1992).
7 See, e.g., ALASKA R. EvID. 504; Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (West 1994);
Amz. RLy. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062(4) (West 1989); ARK. UNto. R. EvM. 503; CAL. Evnm.
CODE §§ 990-1007 (West 1966 & Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1987 &
Supp. 1996); DEL. UNr. R. EvuD. 503; D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (1981); HAW. R. EviM.
504; IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Supp. 1986); 735 ILL. Cown. STAT. ANN. 5/8-802 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5(4) (West 1983 & Supp. 1996); Iow1A CODE ANN.
§ 622.10 (West 1950 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-427 (1994); ME. R. EviD. 503;
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federal courts still abide by the traditional axiom that a physician-patient
privilege did not exist at common law and thus have declined to recognize a
similar right to the protection of such confidential information. 8 This difference
between state and federal evidentiary law is inportant because, in a civil action
where an item of proof is directed to both a federal and state claim or defense,
and the privilege is recognized by state law but not under federal law, the item
or information is generally admitted into evidence. 9 Consequently, the federal
MIcH. COMp. LAWs ANN. § 600.2157 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 767.5a (West 1982 & Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1)(d) (West 1988 & Supp.
1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-21 (1972 & Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(5)
(West 1996); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-805 (1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 329:26
(1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); N.M. R. EviD. 504;
N.Y. Civ. PAc. L. & R. § 4504 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53
(1986); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B) (Anderson Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 40.235 (1988); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 5929 (1982); TEX. R. EvID. 509; UTAH R. Evw.
506; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1612 (Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399 (Michie 1992
& Supp. 1997); WASH. Rnv. CODE AN. § 5.60.060(4) (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101 (Michie 1977).
8 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977) (stating that "[the
physician-patient evidentiary privilege is unknown to the common law"); Gilbreath v.
Guadalupe Hosp. Found., Inc., 5 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Mancuso,
444 F.2d 691, 695 (5th Cir. 1971), and Barnes v. United States, 374 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir.
1967), in declining to recognize a federal physician-patient privilege).
9 See S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 12 n.17 (1974); cf., e.g., Win. T. Thompson Co. v.
General Nutrition Corp., Inc., 671 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1982) (declining to apply state
accountant-client privilege because federal law did not provide for same); Perrignon v.
Bergen Bnmswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 459 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (holding that "in federal
question cases where pendent state claims are raised the federal common law of privileges
should govern all claims of privilege raised in litigation"). Weinstein's Evidence observes that
the very circumstance
makes no sense whatsoever, because the moment privileged information is divulged [for
the purpose of the federal claim,] the point of having the [state] privilege is largely
lost .... [Admittedly,] [tihis solution seems most in accord with the general policies of
the federal rules, favoring truth, uniformity and simplicity, but it denigrates the
substantive policy behind the state privilege.
2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGA=r A. BERGER, WEInSmEN's EvIDENcE 501[02], at 501-
25 (1996). In testimony before Congress prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, Dr. Thomas G. Dorrity expressed concern that the omission of a general physician-
patient privilege "could destroy the hard-won gains in two thirds of the states which [have,] in
varying degrees, legislatively recognized the patient's right to privacy, confidentiality, and
privilege." 119 CONG. REc. S8340 (Mar. 19, 1973) (statement of Dr. Dorrity). Judge Henry
J. Friendly likewise offered that, "[i]f a state recognizes a physician-patient privilege, why
should not its policy prevail... ? What value is there in such a privilege available to one set
of courts but not in another?" Id. at S8343 (statement of Judge Friendly).
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courts' refusal to recognize a physician-patient evidentiary privilege effectively
eviscerates the protections provided for by most of the states, and thereby not
only unnecessarily compromises patient privacy in an important sphere of the
individual's personal life, but also encourages employers or insurance
companies to engage in forum shopping when they can remove cases from state
to federal courts.10
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 ("Rule 501") calls for the federal courts to
develop evidentiary privileges through "principles of the common law... in
light of reason and experience."" Although federal courts have been reluctant
to recognize new privileges 12 besides those traditionally recognized at common
law, 13 the United States Supreme Court recently held in a landmark decision,
Jaffee v. Rednond,14 that Rule 501 provides for a psychotherapist-patient
privilege, protecting patients from the compulsory disclosure of confidential
communications by their psychotherapists. 15
This Note proposes that the evidentiary privilege in federal courts under
Rule 501 should be extended to cover at least some communications between
medical patients and their physicians. In Part II, this Note will discuss the rise
and decline of the physician-patient relationship as a constitutionally protected
zone of privacy and assess the arguments for and against recognizing physician-
patient privilege as a right of informational privacy. In Part III, this Note will
describe the common law and statutory development of the physician-patient
privilege and its recognition by the Supreme Court in the psychotherapist-
patient sphere in Jaffee. In Part IV, this Note will examine the Supreme Court's
construction of Rule 501 in Jaffee and explore the implications of this
construction with regard to the recognition by federal courts of a broad-based
physician-patient privilege. This Note concludes that Rule 501 should be
extended to protect patients from the compulsory disclosure of some
confidential communications to their physicians, including information
contained in medical records or obtained from genetic material.
10 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
11 See FED. R. Evm. 501.
12 Cf. CHARLES TMFORD McCoRMICK, McCoRMIcI ON EVIDENCE § 105, at 228
(Edward Cleary 2d ed. 1972) (asserting that "[m]ore than a century of experience with the
statutes has demonstrated that the privilege in the main operates not as the shield of privacy
but as the protector of fraud. Consequently, the abandonment of the privilege seems the best
solution").
13 Compare Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602 n.28 with Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383 (1981) (recognizing an attorney-client privilege under Rule 501 and extending it to
communications between a corporation's counsel and employees).
14 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
15 See id. at 1931.
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11. THE MEDICAL PRIVILEGE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A. Development of the Informational Right to Privacy
The concept of a legal right to privacy is an ancient concept that lies at the
very foundation of law and civilization. 16 Since the thirteenth century, there has
been a growing recognition in Western societies of a fundamental right of
personal freedom, or liberty, from the unsolicited interference of public or
private authorities into matters of great interest to the individual with
comparatively little significance for the Crown, state, or community as a
whole.17
16 See Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1419-20
(1974) (stating that "privacy is as old as law, implicated in the concept of the individual and
all that is ascribed to the individual-in laws regulating his status and his relations, or
protecting his person against assault, his reputation against slander, his property against
trespass or conversion"); cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (observing
that marriage is a "right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights"); ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 8-22 (1967) (tracing the concept of a desire for privacy back to
primitive society and the animal world, and observing that "It]he respect given to... claims
to withhold information [is] part of the way social structure is defined in all societies").
17 See, e.g., S. AFR. CoNsT., ch. 2, § 14 ("Everyone has the right to privacy...
(adopted May 8, 1996); cf., e.g., DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CrTzEN
(France 1789) (co&fied in CoNrsT. 1791) (Frank Maloy Anderson tram.), reprinted in
CoNsiTToNs THAT MADE HI oRY 83-85 (Albert P. Blaustein & Jay A. Sigler eds.,
1988), which states in part:
§ 4. Liberty consists in the power to do anything that does not injure others;
accordingly, the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those that
secure to the other members of society the enjoyment of these same rights. These limits
can be determined only by law.
§ 5. The law has the right to forbid only such actions as are injurious to society.
Nothing can be forbidden that is not interdicted by the law, and no one can be
constrained to do that which it does not order.
Id. Earlier charters articulating basic individual and community liberties include the (English)
Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M. (Eng.), reprinted in 6 STATuTns OF THE REALM 142 (1810);
Statute of Kalisz, 1264 (Pol.), reprinted in 1264 Statute on Jewish Liberties in Poland
(Thomas 0. Macadoo tram.), in Iwo CYPRLAN POGONOwsIa, JEws iN POLAND: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 39-58 (1993); and MAGNA CHARTA, 1215 (codified in Magna
Charta, 25 Edw. (1297)) (Eng.). The Magna Charta's "per legem terrae" clause is the direct
antecedent of our Due Process clauses. See id. at § 39 ("No freeman shall be captured or
imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed... except by the
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."). Cf. U.S. CONST. amends. V ("No
person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "),
1998]
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1. Origins of the Informational Right to Privacy Under the American
Constitution
The first United States Supreme Court decision recognizing privacy as a
right under the Constitution was Boyd v. United States,18 in which Justice
Joseph P. Bradley stated that the "very [essence] of constitutional liberty and
security" lay in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections of the individual
from "the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security." 19 In 1890,
Samuel D. Warren, Jr. and Louis D. Brandeis published their seminal article
The Right to Privacy,20 in which they advocated the recognition of a new
common law tort action against, or equitable injunction preventing, actions that
deprived the individual of the opportunity to determine the extent to which his
or her "thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others," 21
except where the matter concerned the general interest or was made public by
the individual voluntarily, and regardless of whether the matter was true or was
published without malice.22 They warned that changes in technology and
culture required recognizing such a right to privacy, 23 which they also referred
to as the "right 'to be let alone."' 24 A few months after the publication of the
Warren and Brandeis article, the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of
a "right to be let alone" under the Constitution with regard to an individual's
XlV, § 1 ("No State shall... deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... ").
18 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
19Id. at 630.20 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890).
21 Id. at 198.
22 See id. at 214-20.
23 Warren and Brandeis asserted that:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence
of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have
become more essential to the individual; but modem enterprise and invention have,
through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
Id. at 196.
24 See id. at 195 (quoting THotMAs M. Coo=Y, CooLEY oN TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)
("The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity; to be let
alone.-)).
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physical person25 and held that a plaintiff in a civil tort action could not be
compelled to undergo a surgical examination to determine the extent of the
individual's injuries. 26 Later, Brandeis himself, as an Associate Justice on the
Supreme Court, sought the recognition of a comprehensive right to personal
liberty27 and privacy28 under the Constitution, including the protection of
private communications from criminalization by the state. 29 The right to
privacy envisioned by Brandeis throughout his career clearly encompassed a
25 See Union Pae. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
26 See id. The opinion was authored by Justice Horace Gray, for whom Brandeis had
clerked ten years earlier. See PHmUPPA STRuM, Louis D. BRAmraEis: Jusnce FoR THE
PEOPLE 32-33 (1984); LEWLs J. PAPER, BRANDEis 23-25 (1983). Gray's respect for
Brandeis, his penchant for scholarship, and his affiliation with Harvard Law School support
the contention that this recognition of privacy was a direct extension into the constitutional
sphere of Warren and Brandeis's proposed tort right, even though the opinion itself was
something of a paean to notions of interpretivism and judicial restraint. Botsford was
effectively overturned in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), in which the Court
held that the adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 gave the courts the power to
compel a medical examination of a party, which the Court in Botsford had held they did not
(then) possess.
27 Brandeis attributed to the Framers the ideal "that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their faculties," see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and asserted that "all fundamental rights comprised within
the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the States." Id. at
373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
28 See, e.g., Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932) (recognizing the "right to
be let alone" of members of a captive audience from advertising billboards).
29 See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334-43 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the privacy of the home and
family with regard to matters of personal conscience, such as where state or federal laws
purport to prohibit the teaching of a particular doctrine or belief). Brandeis's views largely
parallel many of those expounded by James Madison, as reflected in the legislative history of
the federal Bill of Rights. See House of Representatives Debates, May-June, 1789 (statement
of Rep. Madison, June 8, 1789), reprinted in 2 Trm BiLL OF RIGHTs: A DocumENTARY
HIISTORY 1026-28 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) [hereinafter TiE BuIL oF RIGHTS] (quoting
Madison's nine proposed constitutional amendments-collectively, the direct forerunner of the
Bill of Rights-including a positive right to "the enjoyment of life and liberty... and
generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety" in his first proposed amendment (as
well as the correlative negative guarantee against federal deprivation of this right in his fourth
proposed amendment, which was ultimately ratified as part of the Fifth Amendment); a
guarantee in his fourth proposed amendment against "the full and equal rights of conscience
be[ing] in any manner, or in any pretext, infringed" by the federal government; and a
prohibition against any state infringement upon these "equal rights of conscience" in his fifth
proposed amendment. Id. at 1026-27. These provisions were approved by the House, but
were discarded by the Senate and thus not submitted to the respective state legislatures for
ratification. See id. at 1053).
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broad right to the protection of personal information from unwarranted public
disclosure, including an evidentiary privilege. 30
2. The Recognition of a Right to Informational Privacy
The modem groundwork for an informational right to privacy was
established by Justices William 0. Douglas and John Marshall Harlan in their
dissenting opinions in Poe v. Ullman,31 a case which addressed the
constitutionality of a Connecticut statute which forbade the use or
encouragement of the use of any contraceptive drug or device. 32 The Court
dismissed the action on jurisdictional grounds. 33 However, Justices Douglas
and Harlan, writing in dissent, argued that the decision should have reached the
merits of the case and sketched out their ideas for resolving the issue presented.
Justice Douglas observed that "[t]he right of the doctor to advise his patients
according to his best lights seems so obviously within First Amendment rights
as to need no extended discussion." 34 He touched on the notion of liberty
"gain[ing] content from the emanations of other specific guarantees" in the Bill
of Rights35 and expressed his belief that the statute violated the Fourteenth
30 Writing in dissent in Olmstead v. United States, Brandeis declared:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion
by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a
criminal proceeding, offacts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of
the Fifth.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
31 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
32 See id. at 498-500 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958)).
33 See id. at 502-09.
34 Id. at 513 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (decrying the "sealing of the lips of a doctor
because he desires to observe the law, obnoxious as the law may be").
35 See id. at 517 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing NAACP v. Alabama cc rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
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Amendment's Due Process Clause.3 6 He concluded that the statute at issue
constituted "an invasion of the privacy that is implicit in a free society" 37 that
"emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we
live." 38 Justice Harlan, in his dissent, argued that due process goes beyond any
formula, but represents "the balance which our Nation ... has struck between
that liberty [of the individual] and the demands of organized society," and
which the Court should determine through "judgment and restraint." 39
Four years later, the Supreme Court recognized a federal constitutional
substantive right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.40 In Griswold, the
Court readdressed the constitutionality of the same state statute as the one at
issue in Poe.41 Justice Douglas, this time writing for the Court, drew on and
embellished upon his dissenting opinion in Poe, delineating the existence of
"penumbras" 42 emanating from the specific constitutional guarantees, such as
the right of association implied by the First Amendment, 43 and the "zones of
privacy" created by the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, in
conjunction with the Ninth Amendment. 44
36 See Id. at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (asserting that if the state "can make this law,
it can enforce it. And proof of its violation necessarily involves an inquiry into the relations
between man and wife").
37 Id. at 521 (Douglas, j., dissenting).
3 8 Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
3 9 Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan described the liberty interest as
comprising "not a series of isolated points... [but] a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints" and which "recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that
certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment." Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
40 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
41 See id. at 480.
42 .Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(describing the right to be let alone articulated by Justice Brandeis as one arising from a
"penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments" (emphasis added), which Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes "[did] not deny" but was also "not prepared" to accept (emphasis added)).
43 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-84 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958)).
44 See id. at 482, 484-86 (citing the "penumbral rights of 'privacy and repose'" cast by
the First Amendment's implicit right of association, Third Amendment's prohibition against
quartering soldiers in peace time, Fourth Amendment's protection against illegal searches and
seizures, and Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination privilege clause, as interpreted in light of
the Ninth Amendment's reservation clause). In this respect, Justice Douglas's quest for
constitutional privacy resembles Chief Justice John Marshall's search through the Constitution
for a "penumbral" requirement of judicial review. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803). Justice Douglas also cited the probable overbreadth of the statute in
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Justice Harlan, concurring, drew heavily from his own dissent in Poe in
suggesting that the state's infringement upon the appellant's privacy interest
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.45 While Justice
Douglas's opinion for the Court established constitutional recognition of the
right to privacy, it was Justice Harlan's concurring opinion that established the
precedent the Court would follow in the subsequent expansion of the privacy
doctrine.46
Subsequent to Griswold, the Court expanded the domain of constitutional
informational privacy to include both a procedural right under the Fourth and
question and traditional respect for the privacy inherent in the marital relationship to justify
the decision. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482, 485-86. Interestingly, Justice Douglas originally
intended to base the Griswold opinion entirely on the First Amendment right of association
discovered in NAACP, but at Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.'s urging, instead adopted the
landmark "zones of privacy" approach. See BERNARD ScwARTz, A HISTORY OF THE
SUPmEM COURT 338-39 (1993) [hereinafter SCHIWARTZ, HIsroRY].
45 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Byron R. White
also wrote a separate concurrence relying upon the Due Process Clause. See id. at 502-07
(White, J., concurring). Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, while joining Justice Douglas's opinion,
concurred separately to emphasize the role of the Ninth Amendment as an expression by the
Framers that "fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight
amendments" and that "the list of rights included there [are] not [to] be deemed exhaustive."
Id. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).' He asserted that the Ninth Amendment extends
protection from government infringement to those fundamental rights not specified in the Bill
of Rights, see id. at 486-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring), but "which exist alongside those
fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments." Id. at
488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Because privacy in marriage is "so basic and fundamental
and so deep-rooted in our society," id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring), and "as old and as
fundamental as our entire civilization," it is "protected from abridgement by the Government
though not specifically mentioned in the Constitution" via the Due Process Clause. Id. at 496
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
46 It was clearly Justice Douglas's intention in Griswold to guide the newfound right to
privacy between the Odyssean Scylla and Charybdis of substantive due process and judicial
restraint-the former still tainted with the stigma of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), and its progeny, and the latter compelling the denial of relief-by declining any
reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment and instead finding privacy to be a pervasive
characteristic of the acknowledged substantive privileges of the Bill of Rights. See Griswold,
381 U.S. at 481-82. Justice Harlan, however, had not joined the opinion of the Court in
Ferguson v. Skrnpa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), and thus had never committed himself to the
repudiation of substantive due process. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 523 & n.18 (Black, J.,
dissenting). This allowed Justice Harlan the freedom to discover a right to privacy under the
Due Process Clause without violating the integrity of his established judicial philosophy. In
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the right to privacy was explicitly recognized by the
Court as one falling under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 153.
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Fifth Amendments, 47 and a substantive right derived from the First,48 Ninth,49
and Fourteenth Amendments50 over fundamental aspects of an individual's
47 See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989)
("The [Fourth] Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against
certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government."); Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977) (quoting Philip B. Kurland, The Private I, U. Cm. MAG. 7, 8
(Autumn 1976), in stating that the individual has a right "to be free... from governmental
surveillance and intrusion"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (finding that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," and thus "what [one] seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected"); id. at
361-62 (Harlan, J., concurring) (contending that the Fourth Amendment affords protection
from warmantless searches where one has a subjective expectation of privacy that society
recognizes as objectively reasonable); Tehan v. United States cc rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416
(1966) (quoting United States v, Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J.,
dissenting), in stating that the Fifth Amendment protects each individual's right "to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life"); see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREAT E ON
THE CONSTIItONAL LTrAIoNs WHICH REST UPON Tm LEGLATIvE PowER OF THE
UNrrm STATES OF THE AMEmCAN UNION 299-300 (4th ed. "1878) ("The maxim that 'every
man's house is his castle' is made a part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures.").
48 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion
for the Court asserted that:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the
power to control men's minds.
Id. at 565. See also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-19 (1984)
(recognizing "freedom of intimate association" which secures certain human relationships
from "undue intrusion by the State"); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); cf.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-22 (1971) (delineating spheres where individual
privacy may trump another's right to free speech).
4 9 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992)
(citing the Ninth Amendment in observing that "[n]either the Bill of Rights nor the specific
practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer
limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects"); Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that "the autonomous
control over the development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and
personality" are "aspects of the right to privacy" that are "'retained by the people' in the
meaning of the Ninth Amendment").
50 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 847 (asserting that "[ilt is a promise of the Constitution
that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter"); Whalen, 429
U.S. at 599 (stating that the individual has an interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal
matters); id. at 599-600 (stating that the individual has an "interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions"); cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)
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autonomy 5' or "personhood"52 implicit in the liberty interest of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 53 The procedural aspect of the right has
been applied to prevent the state from using evidence obtained in a manner
(holding that "[i]llegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner" is "conduct that shocks
the conscience" and violates the Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (acknowledging a "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter").
51 See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideas in the
Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 446-57 (1983); Tom Gerety, Redefining
Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 236 (1977) (contending that privacy necessitates
"an autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal identity"); see also LAUREN E H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAw § 15-1, at 1302 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that "privacy
is nothing less than society's limiting principle"); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSrEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXRESSION 545 (1970), quoted in David L. Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12
GoNz. L. REv. 587, 588 (1977) (contending that "the concept of a right to privacy attempts
to draw a line between the individual and the collective, between self and society. It seeks to
assure the individual of a zone in which to be an individual, not a member of the
community"); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YAME L.J. 475, 493 (1968) (defining privacy as
"that aspect of social order by which persons control access to information about
themselves"); Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTrGERs L. REV. 275, 281
(1974) (contending that "privacy is control over when and by whom the various parts of us
can be sensed by others"); cf. JOHN STUART MIL, ON LmETY 9 (Alburey Castell ed. 1947),
articulating the principle that:
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.... Over himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign.
Id.
52 The term "personhood" has pervaded privacy doctrine to such an extent that it is often
regarded as the value underlying the right to privacy, and is sometimes even used
synonymously with the right itself See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L.
REv. 737, 752 (1989). It "includes elements of the concepts of individuality, autonomy, and
privacy, but none of these words is sufficient." J. Braxton Craven, Personhood: The Right to
Be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699, 702. Cf. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 205
(referring to the "inviolate personality").
53 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. The Court contended that:
matters... central to personal dignity and autonomy... are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State.
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deemed unconstitutional in a criminal prosecution, whereas the substantive
aspects of the right54 have been applied to prevent the state from interfering in
certain "zones of privacy"55 relating to personal information about or
fundamental rights of the individual.
B. The Decline of the Informational Right to Privacy
In 1973, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade56 that the right to privacy
encompasses a woman's right to obtain an abortion prior to the fetus reaching
viability outside of the womb.57 Justice Harry A. Blackmun's opinion for the
Court vested this right in a complex interaction among several factors, most
notably the privacy inherent in the physician-patient relationship, 58 as well as
the woman's fundamental right to choose to terminate her pregnancy 59 and the
54 The various aspects of privacy have been distinguished in a variety of ways. Justices
Brennan and Douglas identified three distinct freedoms. See SCHWARTZ, HISTORY, supra note
44, at 358 (noting that the three freedoms are "first, freedom from bodily restraint or
inspection, freedom to do with one's body as one likes, and freedom to care for one's health
and person; second, freedom of choice in the basic decisions of life... ; and, third,
autonomous control over the developmentand expression of one's intellect and personality");
cf Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210-15 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). Others have
distinguished among privacy inhering in the place, person, or relationship. See P. ALLAN
DIoNIsOpouLos & CRAIG R. DUCAT, THE RIGHT TO PRiVACY: ESSAYS AND CAsEs (1976); Cf.
Gary L. Bostwick, Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate
Decision, 64 CAL. L. REv. 1447 (1976), between interests in the collection of data about
oneself and the dissemination of that information, see Bazelon, supra note 51, at 613, or
between aspects of the right that look inward toward the individual from society's outmost
perimeter, and outward toward society from the individual, see TRIBE, supra note 51, § 15-1,
at 1302-04. Professor Ken Gormley distinguishes five separate "species" of privacy: tort
privacy, Fourth Amendment privacy, First Amendment privacy, fundamental-decision
privacy, and state constitutional privacy. See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy,
1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1340.
55 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
56 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
57 See id. at 153.
58 See id. at 163-66 (holding that "the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently,
and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the
physician"). At conference, the justices' discussion centered on the issue of the physician's
right to exercise his professional judgment. See SCawARTZ, HISTORY, supra note 44, at 340-
41; BOB WOODWARD & ScoTr ARMSTRONG, Tim BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
169 (1979); Philippa Strum, Hany Andrew Blackmun, in THE SUPRE m COURT JuSTICES: A
BIOGRAPImCAL DICTIONARY 15, 18 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994).
59 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-55.
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state's interest in protecting potential human life. 60 Thus, the Court explicitly
recognized the right to privacy over the physician-patient relationship that was
implicit in its decision in Botsford.6' However, the opinion also limited the
potential scope of constitutional privacy, finding that "only personal rights that
can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty'... are included in this guarantee of personal privacy." 62 Thus,
although the decision acknowledged a constitutional right to privacy with regard
to the doctor-patient relationship, it limited this right to those aspects of the
relationship that could impede a woman's ability to obtain medical services
deemed to be fundamental rights and did not encompass a general privacy
interest in confidential physician-patient communications. 63
In Whalen v. Roe,64 the Court recognized that the right to privacy consisted
of at least two distinct interests: the "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters," 65 and the "interest in independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions." 66 The New York law at issue, establishing a
centralized computer file containing the names and addresses of all individuals
who receive, pursuant to a doctor's prescription, certain drugs deemed to have
illegitimate as well as legitimate uses,67 was challenged by patients and
60 See id. at 160-66 (holding that the state's interest in protecting potential human life
becomes compelling at the point of viability).
61 See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), discussed supra in
notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
62 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). The
Court, synthesizing precedent, extended this right to activities related to marriage,
procreation, contraception, faimily relationships, and child rearing and education. See id. at
152-53.
63 The reaches of this fundamental rights approach were clarified in Planned Parenthood
of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Danforth struck down spousal and parental
consent laws, but upheld a state requirement that a woman give written consent in order to
receive an abortion. See id. at 65-82. It also upheld recordkeeping provisions that were
reasonably related to preserving maternal health and "properly respect[ful [of] a patient's
confidentiality and privacy." Id. at 80.
64 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
65Id. at 599.
66 Id. at 599-600.
67 See id. at 591 (citing 1972 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3300 (McKinney Supp. 1976-
1977)). The law required that the State Health Department be provided with a form recording
information concerning every prescription for a Schedule II drug-including the names of the
prescribing physician, dispensing pharmacy, drug and dosage, as well as the patient's name,
address, and age-with "pertinent data" recorded on tapes for computer processing for the
purpose of preventing these drugs from being diverted into unlawful channels. See id. at 591-
93.
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physicians concerned that the computerized data bank program, and fear of its
misuse, would cause patients to decline treatment. 68 The district court enjoined
enforcement of the statute, finding it needlessly broad and intruding on a
constitutionally protected zone of privacy.69 The Supreme Court unanimously
reversed, finding the statute's privacy safeguards sufficient that the program
"does not, on its face, pose a sufflciently grievous threat... to establish a
constitutional violation." 70 Thus, while the Court recognized the informational
right to privacy, it applied a balancing test to determine whether a
constitutionally recognized liberty interest had been violated, 71 rather than the
strict scrutiny test applied to infringements upon fundamental rights or the
rational basis test traditionally applied otherwise.72 The Court affirmed this
approach in Nixon v. Administrator of General Serices.73 Thus, Whalen
offered the promise of a constitutionally protected right to informational privacy
within the physician-patient relationship, but vested courts with only an
intermediate level of scrutiny with which to evaluate state infringements upon
this right.
68 See id. at 595.
69 See Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding that "[a]n
individual's physical ills and disabilities, the medication he takes, [and] the frequency of his
medical consultation are among the most sensitive of personal and psychological
s'bilities .... Indeed, generally one is wont to feel that this is nobody's business but his
doctor's and his pharmacist's"). The Court found that only a compelling interest, narrowly
tailored, may justify govemmental impingement upon this right of privacy, and held the law
at issue unconstitutional. See hi. at 937-38.
70 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600 (emphasis added).
71 See id. at 601-02 (holding that "the remote possibility that judicial supervision of the
evidentiary use of particular items of stored information will provide inadequate protection
against unwarranted disclosures is surely not a sufficient reason for invalidating the entire
patient-identification program"); id. at 605-06 (noting that the Court was upholding only the
statute at issue); cf id. at 606 (Brenman, J., concurring) (emphasizing that without the
protections specifically provided for in the New York statute, the statute would be struck
down in the absence of a compelling state interest).
72 Cf United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
73 433 U.S. 425, 457-65 (1977) (holding that the Act at issue was constitutional due to
the important public interest in materials sought which, taken in concert with regulations
aimed at "preventing undue dissemination of private materials," outweighed the former
President's expectation of privacy); cf. Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d
Cir. 1983). Several federal courts have subsequently applied similar balancing tests in
evaluating informational privacy interests. See In re Search Warrant (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67,
71-72 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying balancing test in finding medical records to be within a
constitutionally protected sphere); Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional
Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REv. 133, 146-50 (1991).
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The Court has subsequently vacillated between extending and retracting this
right to informational privacy in the medical sphere. Within the context of the
abortion debate, the Court briefly asserted the right to privacy to invalidate laws
intruding into the doctor-patient dialogue. 74 In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,75 however, the Court upheld most of the
previously considered regulations intruding upon the physician-patient
relationship 76 based on an "undue burden" test.77 Casey also considered the
recordkeeping requirements of the Pennsylvania statute at issue, which
mandated that a report be filed with the state identifying detailed information
about the patient and physician, but not the patient's name.78 The Court upheld
these as well because they served a valid purpose and did not impose an undue
burden on the woman's fundamental right to obtain an abortion.79
The Court also considered the scope of physician-patient privacy in Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health80 and Washington v. Glucksberg,81
two cases addressing the reach of the Due Process Clause with regard to the so-
called "right to die with dignity."'82 In Cruzan, a majority of the Court
74 See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986) (striking down laws requiring that the physician tell his or her abortion patients that the
fetus she is carrying is a human life and describe it in detail, that the physician not delegate
the duty of informed consent, that the patient wait twenty-four hours before receiving an
abortion, that the physician inform the patient of financial incentives to keep the child, and
that the physician provide state-supplied printed materials designed to discourage abortion);
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking down
laws similar to those in Thornburgh, supra, except for the last two).
75 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
76 See id. at 884 (holding that "[w]e see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement
that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here"); see also id. at 872-
73 (rejecting Roe's trimester formula); id. at 885-86 (upholding twenty-four hour waiting
period); id. at 887-88 (upholding informed consent requirement). The Court did, however,
affirm the "essential holding" of Roe that a woman has a fundamental right to an abortion, see
id. at 846, 852-53, 857-61, 869-72, 878-79, and struck down a spousal consent requirement,
see id. at 887-98.
77 See id. at 877-78 (holding that "[w]hat is at stake is the woman's right to make the
ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations... are
permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to
choose").
78 See id. at 900. Where state-funded institutions are involved, this information becomes
public. See id.
79 See id. at 900-01.
80 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
81117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (opinion of Court and opinion of Souter, J., concurring); 117
S. Ct. 2302 (1997) (opinions of O'Connor, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., concurring).
82 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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acknowledged that "a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment," 83 but asserted that the state
may require "clear and convincing evidence" that this is indeed the patient's
intention. 84 In Glucksberg, the Court was asked to consider whether a
competent, terminally ill patient has a constitutional right to have a physician
actively assist him or her in ending his or her life. However, the Court largely
avoided the physician-patient privacy issue by framing the question presented as
one of "whether the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause
includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in
doing so."85 The Court unanimously held that there was no such right and that
the statute in question prohibiting physician-assisted suicide was thus facially
valid.86 Even so, five justices suggested a willingness to find the statute
unconstitutional as applied to certain situations. 87
83 497 U.S. at 278 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905);
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22, 229 (1990); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,
494 (1980); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979)).
84 See id. at 282-87.
85 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2269.
86 See id. at 2271. The Court found that "[tihe decision to commit suicide with the
assistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection." Id. at 2270. Because
such a right is neither "deeply rooted in our history and traditions, [n]or so fundamental to our
concept of constitutionally ordered liberty," the Court held that it is "not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 2271. On the contrary, the Court held
that the state "has an 'unqualified interest in the preservation of human life.'" Id. at 2272
(quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282). The Court declined to apply a balancing approach that
would "weigh exactingly the relative strengths of these various interests," id. at 2275, finding
it sufficient that the statute was reasonably related to an important state interest. See id. at
2271-75. However, the opinion concluded by acknowledging that the debate will and should
continue in the context of the democratic dialogue. See id. at 2275. Consistent with this
approach, the Court has subsequently refused to review a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision upholding Oregon's Death With Dignity Act (Measure 16) permitting physician-
assisted suicide. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom.
Lee v. Harcleroad, No. 96-1824, 1997 WL 274930 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1997).
87 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor drew a distinction between the Court's opinion that
there is no "right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so,"
which she joined, and the narrower issue of "whether a mentally competent person who is
experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the
circumstances of his or her imminent death," which she saw no need to address. Washington
v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2303 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf id. at 2310
(Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Stevens contended
that while "the State's interest in the contributions each person may make to society
outweighs the person's interest in ending her life, this interest does not have the same force
for a terminally ill patient faced not with the choice of whether to live, [but] only of how to
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Another important case addressing the constitutional limits of government
involvement with physician-patient communications is Rust v. Sullivan.88 In
Rust, the Court upheld against a Fifth Amendment Due Process challenge the
Department of Health and Human Services regulations barring Title X funds
from being used to encourage or promote abortions89 and expressly prohibiting
a physician acting in his or her capacity as a Title X project recipient from
referring a pregnant woman to a doctor who performs abortions "even upon
specific request." 90 The Court distinguished Akron and Thornburgh, which
struck down governmental intrusions into the doctor-patient dialogue, by noting
die." Id. at 2308 (Stevens, J., concurring). He offered that "the State's legitimate interest in
preventing abuse does not apply to an individual who is not victimized by abuse, who is not
suffering from depression, and who makes a rational and voluntary decision to seek assistance
in dying." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice David H. Souter compared the need for
physician assistance in suicide to that in obtaining an abortion, see id. at 2288-90 (Souter, J.,
concurring), and implied that the individual interest "might in some circumstances, or at some
time, be seen as 'fundamental' to the degree entitled to prevail," but saw no need to reach that
issue in the present case, and further determined that the state's interests were "sufficiently
serious" that the statute in question did not facially constitute an "arbitrary or purposeless
restraint." Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Justices Souter, Stevens, O'Connor, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer all emphasized the patient's right to obtain medication to
"alleviate ... suffering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death,"
as well as the state's interest in protecting incompetent or coerced patients from decisions that
are "not truly voluntary." Id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf id. at 2311-12 (Breyer,
J., concurring); id. at 2288 (Souter, J., concurring).
88 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
89 See id. at 178-81, 203.
90 Id. at 180. The Court offered that an acceptable response to such a request would be
for the doctor to inform his or her patient that "the project does not consider abortion an
appropriate method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion."
Id. The Court defended the decision, offering that, because the program does not provide
post-conception medical care, "a doctor's silence with regard to abortion cannot reasonably be
thought to mislead a client into thinking that the doctor does not consider abortion an
appropriate option for her," and a doctor "is always free to make clear that advice regarding
abortion is simply beyond the scope of the program." Id. at 200. The Court added that the
regulations at issue "do not significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship." Id.
Justice Blackmun's dissent charged the Court with upholding content-based and viewpoint-
based regulations of speech and advocacy, see id. at 207-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and
with undermining "the legitimate expectations of the patient and the ethical responsibilities of
the medical profession." Id. at 213-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Cf. Dorothy E. Roberts,
Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 587, 594-95 (1993)
(contending that Rust distorts the patient's impressions of the health consequences of
pregnancy).
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that the intrusion at issue here left available other alternatives for obtaining
information concerning abortions; thus no fundamental right was abridged. 91
C. Analysis
1. Constndng the Constitution: The Interpretivist-Noninterpretivist
Debate
Because a right to informational privacy is not expressly guaranteed in the
Constitution, the recognition of a related right such as physician-patient
privilege is necessarily subsumed within the broader context of determining the
appropriate construction of the Constitution's ambiguous provisions. Most
theories of constitutional construction fall into one of two schools of thought,
known generically as the interpretivist and noninterpretivist schools. 92 The
interpretivist position93 contends that the meanings of the various provisions of
the Constitution are limited to the plain meaning of the text, or where the text is
ambiguous, are frozen in time as they were understood at the moment of
ratification and cannot be changed except by subsequent constitutional
amendment. It also proposes that recognized rights should not be generalized as
abstract principles applicable to unforeseen or uncontemplated circumstances.94
91 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 203.
92 This distinction in interpretational theory should be differentiated from the activist-
versus-restrintist debate concerning the judge's institutional role with respect to the
judiciary's co-equal branches of government. Although interpretivists tend to espouse judicial
restraint and noninterpretivists tend to favor judicial activism, there have been (and continue
to be) many exceptions to this tendency, such as Justice Felix Frankfurter, a noninterpretivist
who practiced judicial restraint, and Justice Hugo L. Black, a strict interpretivist who could
also be deemed a judicial activist.
93 As used here, "interpretivism" includes a broad spectrum of approaches variously
termed "originalist," "positivist," "authoritative reasoning," "strict constructionist,"
"textualist," "new textualist," "intentionalist," "literalist," and "original understanding."
Although related, these terms should not necessarily be regarded as interchangeable. See
Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF INTERPRErAiON:
FEDERAL CouRTS AND TnE LAw 1, 23 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (contrasting his
"textualism" with "so-called strict constructionism, a degraded form of textualism that brings
the whole philosophy into disrepute").
94 C. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.)
(suggesting that the claim of a constitutional right should be evaluated at "the most specific
level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can
be identified").
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The noninterpretivist school,95 by contrast, sees the words of the Constitution as
general premises designed to provide guidance to future generations, but whose
specific meanings should be understood in light of extratextual sources and are
intended to change or evolve over time.96 It accepts the view that contemporary
understandings can supplement and even supersede the original meaning of the
Constitution's text, and favors interpreting the specific protections in the text at
higher levels of abstraction. 97
Interpretivism is founded on the principle that we have a "government of
laws, and not of men," 98 and it is typically justified as being essential to the
interests of "democracy," 99 "predictability," 00 and the need to "secure" rights
95 The noninterpretivist school is variously termed "nonoriginalist," "realist,"
"pragmatic," "arbitrary reasoning," "nontextualist," "extra-textualist," "supplementalist,"
"aspirationist," "living Constitution-ist," or "evolutionistic."
96 This is an ancient debate that antedates the American Constitution by at least two
millennia. The dichotomy between written law and circumstantial fimess was recognized in
ancient Greece, see ARISTOTLE, THE NicHoMAcBEAN ETMCS bk. 5, ch. 2, at 144 (J.E.C.
Welldon ed., 1987), and the need to resolve conflicts between unambiguous text and
unforeseen circumstances was understood in ancient Judah-Israel, see Numbers 26:52-56;
27:1-11. Although it is unclear when the interpretivist-noninterpretivist debate first emerged,
it was vibrant during the early Roman Empire, see Peter Stein, Interpretation and Legal
Reasoning in Roman Law, 70 C.-KENT L. Rnv. 1539 (1995), and it pervades the annals of
Western religio-philosophical jurisprudence. See Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as
Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984).
97 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (contending that the words of the
Constitution "have called into life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to
hope that they had created an organism"); see also RONALD DwORiN, FREEDOM'S LAW:
Tam MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CoNSm oN 73 (1996) (stating that "the Bill of
Rights sets out a network of principles, some extremely concrete, others more abstract, and
some of near limitless abstraction").
98 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
99 More specifically, it presumes that when an amendment to the Constitution is
approved by the people, it is approved with a particular understanding in mind, and thus it is
undemocratic for unelected judges to alter this meaning to suit what they personally believe to
be the exigencies of the time. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TMIaNG OF AMmurcA: TE
POLMCAL SEDUCrION OF THE LAw 5 (1990) (asserting that "judges must consider themselves
bound by law that is independent of their own views of the desirable... [and must] apply the
law as those who made the law wanted [them] to"); LEARNE HAND, TiE BmL OF RGrs 73
(1958) (rejecting as "most irksome" the notion of being "ruled by a bevy of Platonic
guardians"); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv.
703, 705 (1975) (describing the "pure interpretive model" as one subscribing to the
philosophy that "[t]he people have chosen the principle that the statute or practice violated,
have designated it as fundamental, and have written it down in the text of the Constitution for
the judges to interpret and apply"); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wol. A Comment on
1828 [Vol. 58:1809
BEYOND JAFFEE V. REDMOND
over time and insulate them from the political process. 101 Noninterpretivism, on
the other hand, is founded on the principle that "[w]e must never forget, that it
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949 (1973) ("A neutral and durable principle may be a thing
of beauty and a joy forever. But if it lacks connection with any value the Constitution marks
as special, it is not a constitutional principle and the Court has no business imposing it.").
Noninterpretivists who advocate judicial restraint have expressed similar sentiments. Justice
White, for example, has argued that:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-
made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of
the Constitution.... There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the
substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of
rights deemed to be flndamental.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986). See also New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (cautioning that "we must be
ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles"). As Judge Andrew
Kleinfeld has observed:
The Founding Fathers did not establish the United States as a democratic republic so that
elected officials would decide trivia, while all great questions would be decided by the
judiciary .... That an issue is important does not mean that the people, through their
democratically elected representatives, do not have the power to decide it.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 857 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
100 Presumably, the original intent is the easiest and most enduring definition to discern,
and thus allows individuals to create expectations and plan their lives. In the words of Justice
Scalia, "[p]redictability... is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name. There
are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all." Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56U. CH. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989). See also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J.) (observing that "[t]he ideas of natural justice are regulated
by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest of men have differed upon the subject"); O.W.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460 (1897) (stating that "nothing but
confusion of thought can result from assuming that the rights of man in a moral sense are
equally rights in the sense of the Constitution and the law"); cf. Abner J. Mikva, The Care
and Feeding of the United States Constitution, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1131, 1131 (1993)
(observing that "[tihere can hardly be much disagreement that the Court does a poor job of
preserving the Constitution as an intelligible document").
1o Justice Scalia, citing the Contract Clause as an example, contends that if liberties can
be expanded upon, they can also be taken away-" [n]onoriginalism, in other words, is a two-
way street that handles traffic both to and from individual rights." Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855-56 (1989). See also Alex
Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HAZv. L. REv. 1639, 1657 (1993)
(observing that "penumbras and emanations are dangerous business"); cf Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 (1942) (Black, J., concurring) (asserting that "faithful
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is a constitution we are expounding... intended to endure for ages to come,
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." 1o2 It
draws its claim to legitimacy on the grounds that unrestrained majoritarian
democracy may be tyrannical to minorities,'0 3 that originalism is something of
a myth because no such intent or understanding can be definitively
ascertained, 104 that interpretivism is itself a value choice, 105 that the Ninth and
adherence to the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights insures a more permanent protection
of individual liberty than that which can be afforded by... nebulous standards").
102 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819).
103 In the words of Justice Brennan:
Faith in democracy is one thing, blind faith quite another. Those who drafted our
Constitution understood the difference. One cannot read the text without admitting that it
embodies substantive value choices; it places certain values beyond the power of any
legislature .... [Because amending the Constitution is so difficult, to] remain faithful to
the content of the Constitution, therefore, an approach to interpreting the text must
account for the existence of these substantive value choices, and must accept the
ambiguity inherent in the effort to apply them to modem circumstances.
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 19
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2, 6 (1985).
104 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson stated:
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen
modem conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams
Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a half of partisan debate
and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt
quotations from respected sources on each side of any question. They largely cancel each
other.
Id. See also Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) ("A word is not a crystal,
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."); cf 1 BRUCE
AcKm2AN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 34-162 (1991) (challenging the notion that our
Constitution exists as a continuum, from the nation's founding to the present, in embodying
America's "higher law," and discussing the problem of "intergenerational synthesis"-i.e.,
the difficulty in determining whether and to what extent amendments passed by a subsequent
generation represent a modification or repudiation of those constitutional principles established
by the preceding generation when the principles conflict); 2 TIm BILL Op RiGTs, supra note
29, at 1066 (quoting Representative Roger Sherman's argument that subsequent amendments
to the Constitution should be added as a "supplement" at the end of the document, rather than
interspersed throughout the original text, because "[w]e might as well endeavor to mix brass,
iron, and clay, as to incorporate such heterogeneous articles"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE &
MICHAL C. DORF, ON READING TE CoNsrrrtION 6 (1991) (stating that the Framers
"bequeathed to subsequent generations a framework for balancing liberty against power.
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Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution contain provisions explicitly calling
for an expansive interpretation of constitutional rights,' 06 that liberty precedes
However, it is only a framework; it is not a blueprint"); Brennan, supra note 103, at 2, 4-5
(stating that it is impossible to discern whether the courts should look to the drafters,
congressional disputants, or state ratifiers to identify the true source of the "original intent" or
"original understanding," and accusing those who profess fidelity to the original text of
"arrogance cloaked as humility"). Compare McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct.
1511, 1525-30 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (finding that the original understanding of the
First Amendment protects anonymous political speech) with id. at 1530-37 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the original intent does not protect anonymous political speech).
105 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SEIOUSLY 134 (1977) (noting that "a strict
interpretation of the text yield[s] a narrow view of constitutional rights, because it limits such
rights to those recognized by a limited group of people at a fixed date of history"); Brennan,
supra note 103, at 5 (observing that "[a] position that upholds constitutional claims only if
they were within the specific contemplation of the Framers in effect establishes a presumption
of resolving textual ambiguities against the claim of constitutional right," and contending that
"[tihis is a choice no less political than any other .... [It] turn[s] a blind eye to social
progress and eschew[s] adaptation of overarching principles to changes of social
circumstances"); c.f CAss R. SUNSrEIN, Tim PARTIAL CONSTTUIION 68-92 (1993) (arguing
that the belief that judges act impartially when they adhere to the status quo in the interest of
neutrality is misguided, because existing distributions of property rights and personal liberties
are themselves products of law); Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic
Debilitation: Comparative llunination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 245, 245-46 n.4 (1995). Tshnet stated that:
[N]early every constitutional theorist urges minimal judicial review and vigorous
democratic dialogue on issues on which the theorist believes her preferred position is
likely to prevail in the democratic dialogue and more-than-minimal review on issues on
which the theorist believes her preferred position is unlikely to prevail there.
Id.
106 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also U.S. CONsr.
amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people."); JOHN HART ELY, DEmocRACY AND
DsrRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 11-41 (1980); MARK N. GOODMAN, ftE NInrH
AMENDMENT: HISTORY, INTERPRErATON, AND MEANING 4-8 (1981) (reciting historical
materials showing that the original understanding of those clauses in the Constitution limiting
congressional power is that they were "inserted merely for greater caution"); Laurence H.
Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1057, 1100-01 (1990) (contending that "[t]he Ninth Amendment is... the only rule of
construction in the Constitution. It tells judges, legislators, and other interpreters of the
Constitution how not to 'construe' that document.... [It] affirmatively acts as a presumption
in favor of generalizing at higher levels of abstraction") (footnotes omitted); cf Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (enumerating fundamental due process liberty interests);
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (enumemting
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rather than follows from law, 107 that the Framers themselves unanimously
believed in the concept of "inalienable rights" derived from "natural law,"1 08
that the law will lose its legitimacy if it fails to keep up with changes in social
circumstances,10 9 and that there may be times when the interests of justice
fundamental privileges and immunities "which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free
governments").
107 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2306 n.10 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring), in which Justice Stevens asserts that law
is not the source of liberty, and surely not the exclusive source. "I had thought it self-
evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal
unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause protects, rather
than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations."
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)). Cf Tm DECLARATION OF IEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
108 See Virginia Ratifying Convention, 1788, reprinted in 2 TIM BraL OF RMGTs, sUpra
note 29, at 766, 840 (proposing the original draft of a "bill of rights" that provided in its
enumerated guarantees " l st. That there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they
form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity; among which are the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety"); Terry Brennan, Natural Rights
and the Constitution: The Original "Original Intent", 15 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 965
(1992) (observing that "[o]riginalists cannot be positivists," id. at 1029, because all of those
who helped shape our Constitution espoused a belief in the existence of inalienable human
rights which were impossible to exhaustively enumerate and superior to positive law, see id.
at 971-72); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. Rnv. 5 (1949) (documenting the history of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the statements of Congressman John A.
Bingham, author of Section 1, see id. at 42, who described the right not to be "deprived of
life or liberty or property without due process of law" as "law in its highest sense, that law
which is the perfection of human reason, and which is impartial, equal, exact justice ... that
justice which is the highest duty of nations .... " id. at 36 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1865-1866)), and Senator Jacob M. Howard, who stated that the
Constitution guaranteed "personal rights" that included those enumerated in the first eight
amendments but which "are not and can not be fully defined in their entire extent and precise
nature," and who contended that "[t]he great object of the first section of this amendment is,
therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these
great fundamental guarantees," id. at 57-58 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2765 (1865-1866))).
10 9 See BENjAMN N. CARDOzO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIECE 10 (1928)
(contending that "[wie live in a world of change. If a body of law were in existence adequate
for the civilization of today, it could not meet the demands of the civilization of tomorrow");
cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 901, asserting that:
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demand going beyond the safeguards expressed or even implied in the
Constitution.110
Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans to us and
then to future generations .... Each generation must learn anew that the Constitution's
written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than one. We
accept our responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant
in light of all of our precedents. We invoke it once again to define the freedom
guaranteed by the Constitution's own promise, the promise of liberty.
Id.; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (noting that, in evaluating the
constitutionality of school segregation, "we cannot tm back the clock to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted"); National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S.
582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (contending that "[g]reat concepts
like. . . 'liberty'... were purposely left to gather meaning from experience. For they relate
to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the [Founders] knew too well that only
a stagnant society remains unchanged"); West Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 639-40 (1943) (asserting that "the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights,
conceived... [when] liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental
restraints," must be translated "into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems
of the twentieth century"); see also Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic
Docwnent, 56 Gno. WAsH. L. REv. 4, 7 (1987) (suggesting that the inability of the
Constitution to provide for all possible contingencies allows it to constrain courts only "in
setting broad outer bounds to the exercise of judicial discretion rather than in prescribing the
actual rules of decision," the result being that constitutional law "is a body of judge-made
law, constrained by the constitutional text but not derived from it or prescribed by it in a
substantial sense"); Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 269, 301 (1975) (contending that "the meaning of the Constitution's delphic
phrases ... does not inhere in the past alone; its locus is also in the present and future").
Compare U.S. CONST. preamble (stating that the Constitution was established to "secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity") with Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1776,
reprinted in 1 THE BjiL OF RI TS, supra note 29, at 234, 236 ("That no free Government,
or the blessing of liberty, can be preserved to any people but by a firm adherence to justice,
moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fiundamental
principles.") (emphases added).
110 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 124 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[ojccasions may arise where a proceeding falls so far short of conforming to
fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant constitutional condemnation... despite the
absence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights"); Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of
Justice, 35 HARV. L. REv. 113, 117 (1921) (observing that "[c]odification is, in the main,
restatement," and that "a code, if completed, would not dispense [with] mediation between
legislature and judges, for code is followed by commentary and commentary by revision, and
thus the task is never done"); cf William J. Brennan, Jr., The Equality Principle in American
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 48 OHfo ST. L.J. 921, 923 (1987) (contending that
"society... has come to believe that the lawyer and judge in America are uniquely situated
to play a creative role in American social progress"). Compare Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.
309 (1915) (upholding conviction against appellant's due process and habeas corpus
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2. Constitutional Privacy and Physician-Patient Privilege
While theories of constitutional construction tend toward polar extremes of
either clause-bound interpretivism or justice-seeking noninterpretivism, the
scope of the actual debate in practice is much narrower, but still potentially
determinative for highly contentious issues. There is general consensus that the
enigmatic Due Process clauses provide for unenumerated rights,"' that
claims--despite domination of trial by a mob-because formal procedures were complied
with by the trial judge) with Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (striking down school
segregation in District of Columbia via Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause despite absence
of any equal protection guarantee in the Constitution pertaining to the federal government).
Even interpretivists tend to accept some notions of interstitial "gap filling" derived from the
subjective belief that applying the law as written would produce results that are absurd or
clearly antithetical to justice. See ELY, supra note 106, at 50; cf Printz v. United States, 117
S. Ct. 2365, 2370 (1997) (Scalia, J., opinion of Court) ("Because there is no constitutional
text speaking to this precise question, the answer to the... challenge must be sought in
historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the
jurisprudence of this Court."); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that the statute at issue would, if applied as written,
produce an "absurd" result, thus the Court was justified in departing from the plain meaning
of the rule's text); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (stating that a judge's duty is "to ensure that the powers and freedoms the framers
specified are made effective in today's circumstances. The evolution of doctrine to accomplish
that end contravenes no postulate of judicial restraint"); Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608,
624 (2d Cir. 1944) (Learned Hand, J., concurring) (asserting that "[tlhere is no surer way to
misread a document than to read it literally"), aff'd sub nom. Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324
U.S. 244 (1945).
111 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997) ("[Ihe Due
Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the 'liberty' it protects includes more
than the absence of physical restraint. The Clause also provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.") (citations
omitted); id. at 2268 (stating that this liberty interest has "never [been] fully clarified, to be
sure, and perhaps [is] not capable of being fully clarified"); Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (asserting that "fundamental rights, even though not
expressly guaranteed, have been recognized by the Court as indispensable to the enjoyment of
rights explicitly defined"). Professor Gormley has noted that, with regard to the right to
privacy under the Fourth Amendment,
the entire Court-including the conservative wing-has displayed little difficulty in
interpreting and applying unwritten principles in the Constitution. Nowhere is the word
"privacy" mentioned in the Fourth Amendment. Nowhere does the Constitution speak of
"reasonable expectations" of privacy, nor define how society in its collective wisdom is
to arrive at a determination of "reasonableness" or "unreasonableness" in twentieth
century America. Yet the Court has applied these concepts with no apparent difficulty,
using the precise judicial tools-unspecified text, constitutional history, evolving case
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tradition and precedent supply invaluable guidance in discerning these rights,112
and that judges must use "judgment and restraint" in evaluating the
constitutionality of individual rights claims. 113 However, the Court has
continued to struggle with the degree to which these rights must be "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" 114 for a right to be recognized, as
well as the extent to which analogic reasoning may be applied to bring
unforeseen circumstances within the orbit of a recognized right.
Despite the considerable degree of consensus, the differences in the
interpretive theories expressed by recent majorities of the Court are significant
enough that the theory applied to interpreting the Constitution could prove to be
the determinative factor in evaluating whether physician-patient privilege is a
right deserving of constitutional protection. In Casey, the Court relied upon
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe as the appropriate formula for adjudicating
substantive due process claims. The Court adopted Justice Harlan's view that its
responsibility was to apply "reasoned judgment" in determining whether a
statute at issue constitutes an arbitrary imposition or purposeless restraint on a
protected liberty. 115 Although Justice Harlan's understanding emphasized
tradition, it also acknowledged that "tradition is a living thing,"11 6 and
recognized on an equal footing with tradition the importance of a decision to
law, modem societal norms-which have generated so much controversy in other areas
of privacy law, particularly in the abortion and fundamental-decision privacy cases.
Gormley, supra note 54, at 1372-73.
112 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 849-50 (citing Poe v. Ulfman, 367 U.S. 497, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
113 See id.; see also United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
bane) (Posner, J., dissenting) (contending that neither positivistic objectivity and political
neutrality with substantive injustice, nor ad hoc pragmatic justice with uncertainty and judicial
willfulness, "is entirely satisfactory," and observing that "[i]t is no wonder that our legal
system oscillates between the approaches"), aff'd sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 500
U.S. 453 (1991); Stack v. New York N.H. & H.R. Co., 58 N.E. 686, 687 (Mass. 1900)
(stating that, although "in a clear case it might be possible even to break away from a line of
decisions... based on a deeper insight into the present wants of society," the courts'
"general duty is not to change, but to work out, the principles already sanctioned by the
practice of the past"); cf. Scalia, supra note 101, at 861-62, 864 (observing that "there is
really no difference between the faint-hearted originalist and the moderate nonoriginalist");
BEmNAMI N. CARDozo, TBE GRoWTI OF THE LAw 2 (1924) (observing that "[r]est and
motion, unrelieved and unchecked, are equally destructive. The law... must find some path
of compromise.... All depends on the wisdom with which the joinder is effected").
114 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
115 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847-50.
116 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (H1arlan, J., dissenting).
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break away from a tradition. 117 Thus, although common law tradition does not
recognize a physician-patient privilege, 118 the decision by nearly every state to
statutorily break away from this tradition, 119 taken in concert with the effective
negation of these state statutes that results from the absence of such a privilege
in federal courts,120 could render the admissibility of physician-patient
communications in federal courts an impermissible, arbitrary imposition on the
individual liberty interest in seeking medical treatment and consultation. 121
In Glucksberg, however, the Court adopted a different standard for
evaluating due process claims. Chief Justice Rehnquist's two-part test required,
first, that an asserted right must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition," and second, that there must be a "careful description" of the liberty
interest-that is, the interest must be construed at a very narrow level of
generality.' 22 Moreover, the Court explicitly rejected the applicability of a
balancing test to evaluate inexplicit substantive due process claims.' 23 Applying
this theory, the Court's balancing test approach from Whalen would be
inapplicable, and the Court's observation in Whalen that physician-patient
confidentiality was not recognized at common law would dispositively foreclose
the possibility of recognizing physician-patient confidentiality as a
constitutionally protected right.' 24
Clearly, there are certain interests arising within the physician-patient
relationship that are so private, personal, and sensitive to disclosure that they
may arguably be deemed compelling and thus deserving of protection as
fundamental rights. 125 There are many more interests that would seem to at
117 See id.
118 SeeWhalenv. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977).
119 See supra note 7.
12 0 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
121 Cf Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (recognizing "unanimous accord"
among states as lending "convincing support to the conclusion we have reached as to the
fundamental nature of that right"). It should be observed that, although this approach could
support the recognition of physician-patient privilege as a constitutional right, it does not
necessarily require such a result. Justice Souter, relying on Justice Harlan's formula in his
Glucksberg concurrence, makes it clear that a sufficiently important state interest can
potentially overcome both a break with tradition and the liberty interest it supports which the
state seeks to infringe upon. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2290-93 (1997)
(Souter, J., concurring).
122 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268.
123 See id.
124 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977).
12 5 For example, in determining the course and direction and quality of one's life,
perhaps one of the most fundamental interests is the right to determine for oneself whether the
individual should know about genetic predispositions for lethal syndromes, the specter of
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least satisfy the balancing test articulated in Whalen. 126 However, given the
Court's preference for avoiding deciding constitutional issues whenever
possible, 127 it is unlikely that the Court will recognize a constitutionally based
evidentiary privilege-not deeply rooted in tradition-that would bar potentially
probative evidence from trial. 128 Moreover, because Rule 501 explicitly allows
the federal courts to recognize privileges through the application of common
law principles (thus raising no interpretivist-noninterpretivist debate issue) in
light of reason and experience (thus eliminating the need to identify a relevant
which may haunt the individual for the remainder of his or her life. Compare CHARim
FRiED, RiGHr AND WRONG 146-47 (1978) (stating that "[w]hat a person is, what he wants,
the determination ofhis lifeplan, of his concept of the good, are the most intimate expressions
of self-determination, and by asserting a person's responsibility for the results of this self-
determination we give substance to the concept of liberty") (emphasis added) with DANmL J.
KEvLEs, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GEN CS AND THE USES OF HuMAN HEnrrY 298
(1995). Kevles notes that:
Many more genetic diseases can now be identified than can be cured or even treated.
Someone with the gene for Huntington's disease might well prefer not to know it, since
the knowledge that he or she will fall victim to it would mean having to live under a
sentence of certain debilitation and doom.
Id.
126 See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17
(1989) (finding that "chemical analysis of [a blood] sample to obtain physiological data
[invades] privacy interests," and that "chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can
reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is
epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic").
127 See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984); County
Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979).
128 It should be observed that the costs to society of recognizing a constitutional right to
privacy in the medical sphere could extend beyond the loss of evidence that is merely
incidental or cumulative medical information in a civil or criminal suit. The problem is that
the Court, upon acknowledging a previously unrecognized right, tends to initially establish a
broad rule, the fine lines of which the Court will only later determine as it gains expertise in
the area of law at issue. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (1996)
(declining to delineate the full contours of the newly discovered psychotherapist-patient
privilege). As a result, the recognition of such a right may lead to its extension to unforeseen
spheres through which it may promote problematic unintended consequences. Cf Washington
v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2293 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that "[tlo
recognize a right of lesser promise would simply create a constitutional regime too uncertain
to bring with it the expectation of finality that is one of this Court's central obligations in
making constitutional decisions"); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
116 S. Ct. 2374, 2403 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that the appropriate action of
the Court was to act with restraint "in times when we know too little to risk the finality of
precision").
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tradition recognizing the fight), it would seem to be more appropriate for the
Supreme Court or federal courts to determine-if indeed they choose to do so-
the existence and scope of a physician-patient evidentiary privilege under Rule
501, rather than under the Constitution.
1I. THE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOTHERAPY PRIVILEGES UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. The Physician-Patient Privilege: Common Law and Statutory
Development
Traditionally, the common law has applied the maxim that "the
public... has a right to every man's evidence." 129 Where privileges have been
recognized by the courts, they have generally had to meet four criteria specified
by Dean Wigmore:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiahty must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulouslyfostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefitthereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.130
Wigmore believed that the attorney-client,' 3 ' husband-wife, 132 and clergy-
communicant 33 relationships met this four-part test, but that the physician-
patient relationship did not.134 He noted that, in 1776, the British judge Lord
Mansfield held that "a surgeon has no privilege, where it is a material question
in a civil or criminal cause.' 35 In 1828, however, New York adopted a
129 See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 JoHN HENRY
WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (3d ed. 1940)).
130 See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, Ev IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2285, at
527 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
131 See id. § 2291, at 549.
132 See id. § 2332, at 642.
133 See id. § 2396, at 878.
134 See id. § 2380a, at 530.
135 See id. § 2380, at 818 (quoting Dutchess of Kingston's Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 355,
573 (1776), reprinted in NOT.ALE BrrsEH TRIA.S SERIES (Melville ed., 1927)).
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statutory privilege, 136 and by 1961, forty-one states had followed suit.137
Wigmore condemned this statutory trend. Applying his own four-part test, he
contended that the physician-patient privilege failed the first, second, and fourth
parts, and thus should not be recognized. 138
Of course, Wigmore's distaste for the privilege was based on a very
different world than the one we have today. Wigmore properly saw the
privilege in his day primarily as a shield for practitioners-of medical fraud and
disputants of a will and saw little interest in giving these "incorrigibles" the
benefit of the law. 139 Although he did perceive the increasing trend toward
136 See 2 N.Y. REv. STAT. 406, pt. 3, ch. 7, art. 9, § 73 (1828).
137 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 130, § 2380, at 819-27 n.5.
138 First, he stated that "[in only a few instances, out of the thousands daily occurring,
is the fact communicated to a physician confidential in any real sense." Id. § 2380a, at 829.
Second, he added that "[e]ven where the disclosure is actually confidential, it would
nonetheless be made though no privilege existed," thus the absence of such a privilege had no
deterrent effect on the willingness of the patient to make the disclosure. Id. (observing that
"[p]eople would not be deterred from seeking medical help because of the possibility of
disclosure in court. If they would, how did they fare in the generations before the privilege
came?"). He conceded the third part of his test, admitting that "no one will deny" the
desirability of fostering the physician-patient relationship, id., § 2380a, at 830, but argued
"emphatically" that the privilege also failed the fourth part, because "there is seldom an
instance where it is not ludicrous to suggest that the party cared at the time to preserve the
knowledge of it from any person but the physician." Id.
13 9 See id., § 2380a, at 831. Wigmore asserted that:
Tihe practical employment of the privilege has come to mean little but the suppression of
the trth .... Ninety-nine per cent of the litigation in which the privilege is invoked
consists of three classes of cases-actions on policies of life insurance where the
deceased's misrepresentations of his health are involved, actions for corporeal injuries
where the extent of the plaintiff's injury is at issue, and testamentary actions where the
testator's mental capacity is disputed. In all of these the medical testimony is absolutely
needed for the purpose of learning the truth. In none of them is there any reason for the
party to conceal the facts, except as a tactical maneuver in litigation.
Id. Certainly, fraud and abuse in the medical field are as prevalent today as ever before, see
generally Sharon L. Davies & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care: Placebo or Wonder
Drug for Health Care Fraud and Abuse?, 31 GA. L. REv. 373 (1997), and obviously all
privileges create the potential for abuse. The tobacco industry, for example, has apparently
used the attorney-client and attomey-workproduct privileges as a shield to conceal its research
into and longstanding knowledge of the health dangers of tobacco smoke and addictiveness of
nicotine. See John Schwartz, Tobacco Firms Shielded Data on Hazards; Florida Ruling
Forces Release of Documents, WAsH. Posr, Aug. 7, 1997, at Al; Milo Geyelin, Liggett
Settlement Puts Spotlight on Industry's Top Legal Group, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1997, at B5;
Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 6, 1997); id. (May 28, 1997). Professor Stanton
A. Glantz has received many of these confidential documents and has made them available
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specialization, he could not have foreseen a world where patients would require
the assistance of physicians as much in the interests of preventative care as with
actual injuries, where every aspect about a person's life would be understood to
have implications for that individual's health, where insurance companies
would exert such a powerful role in society, and where medical records could
be stored, processed, and transmitted instantaneously by computer. Had he
foreseen these future developments of the medical profession in an age of global
communications, limited personal relationships between doctor and patient, and
strong incentives to induce the patient to voluntarily seek preventative care, he
might have thought differently about the need for a physician-patient privilege.
One area of the doctor-patient relationship where the sensitive nature of
such communications has long been recognized is in the psychotherapist-patient
sphere. It is thus not surprising that there is a wealth of litigation over the reach
of the privilege with regard to this particular relationship, and as medicine
increasingly comes to resemble psychotherapy in terms of the sensitive nature
of the physician-patient relationship, 14° the evolution of the law toward the
recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege will become increasingly
relevant to the broader physician-patient relationship.
online. See generally Tobacco Control Archives (visited July 20, 1997) <http://www.
library.ucsf.edu/tobacco.html>; cf U.S. DEP'T OF HEAT & HUMAN SERvs., PREvENtNG
ToBAcco USE AMONG YoUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THm SuRGEON GENERAL (1994)
(finding that smoking kills more than 434,000 Americans each year).
140 For instance, where an oncologist has to inform a patient that his tumor has
metastasized and is inoperable, the physician must get to know the patient so as to minimize
his pain and best understand and meet his physical, emotional (and perhaps spiritual) needs;
similarly, where a family practitioner is asked by a young patient to give her a prescription for
birth control pills, a physician should ideally be able to assess whether the patient is
emotionally mature enough to become involved in a sexual relationship and counsel the
patient accordingly. Even physicians responsible for reporting the results of blood or genetic
testing should have some familiarity with and a personal sense of the patient because such
testing, much like psychotherapy, may reveal deeply personal information about the individual
that he or she may not consciously be aware of and perhaps would prefer not to know. Cf.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2288 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that
"the Court [has] recognized that the good physician is not just a mechanic of the human body
whose services have no bearing on a person's moral choices, but one who does more than
treat symptoms, one who ministers to the patient").
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B. The Movement Toward a Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Evidentiary
Privilege
Prior to the 1970s, few courts recognized a psychotherapist-patient
privilege despite the sensitive nature of the psychotherapeutic relationship. 14 1
This began to change in the 1950s, however, when commentators first started
to look at the psychotherapeutic relationship in isolation from the general
physician-patient relationship.' 42 A law review article in 1952, for instance,
asserted that the psychotherapist-patient relationship is a unique relationship
that, on its own merits, meets all four of Dean Wigmore's criteria for a
privilege. 143 In 1970 the California Supreme Court held in In re
141 The first instance in the United States of a trial judge upholding a psychiatrist's claim
of privilege independent of statutory support appears to have occurred in Binder v. Ruvell,
Civil Docket No. 52C2535 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., III., June 24, 1952) (Harry M. Fisher, J.,
presiding). See Note, Confidential Communications to a Psychotherapist: A New Testimonial
Privilege, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 384, 385 (1952).
142 See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications: IV. Medical and
Counseling Privileges, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1530, 1530 (1985) (citing David W. Louisell, The
Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part 11, 41 MINN. L. REV. 731,731-35 (1957)).
143 See Note, supra note 141, at 386-89. Since then, other commentators have made
similar arguments largely analogous to the following: First, the psychotherapist-patient
relationship requires an exceptionally high degree of trust. For a therapist to be able to help
his or her patients, the patient must be able to freely disclose his or her most closely held
thoughts and feelings. See Advisory Committee's Note for Proposed Rule of Evidence 504,
reprinted in Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242
(1973) [hereinafter Advisory Committee's Note] (finding that psychotherapists "not only
explore the very depths of their patients' conscious, but their unconscious feelings and
attitudes as well. Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient's awareness
and, in order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely"); cf MhcIIL KAHN,
BMVEr THmpisr Am CUENT: THE NEw RELATIONSHIP 3 (1991) (noting that "[t]he
slightest breach of confidentiality can be magnified by the client into a major betrayal");
SIGMUND FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTON TO PsYCHOANALYSIs 22 (Joan Riviere trans.
1952) (offering that "[tihe dialogue which constitutes the analysis will admit of no audience"
because "these communications relate to all his most private thoughts and feelings, all that
which as a socially independent person he must hide from others, all that which, being foreign
to his own conception of himself, he tries to conceal even from himself"). This in tum
requires the therapist to provide his or her patients with the assurance that their elicitations
will remain confidential and privileged from public disclosure. Professor Ralph Slovenko has
observed that, among therapists, there is "near unanimity of opinion" that "nothing about a
patient should be divulged to third parties," ostensibly because, without such an assurance of
absolute confidentiality for the patient, the therapist will not be able to obtain the patient's full
participation, an essential element of successful treatment. Ralph Slovenko, Psychotherapy
and Confidentiality, 24 CLEv. ST. L. Rv. 375, 375 (1975); cf. Advisory Committee's Note,
supra, at 143; Note, supra note 141, at 386-87. The value of psychotherapy to individuals in
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Lifschutz 144 that the federal right to privacy protects some confidential
communications in psychotherapy 45  under some circumstances. 146
Subsequently, when the proposed federal rules of evidence 147 were drafted,
they included among a number of suggested new privileges' 48 a provision
need of such help, and ultimately to the community, is beyond question. See Steven R. Smith,
Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 39 (1980) (noting that
"[s]uccessful psychotherapy may reduce social problems such as juvenile delinquency, marital
complications, and violent crime... [and] may also reduce the cost of caring for dependents
of the mentally ill and increase the productivity of those with mental deficiencies or
difficulties") (footnote omitted). Finally, there is support for the contention that the benefit to
the cause of truth-seeking is outweighed by the detriment to society incurred as a result of the
absence of such a privilege. See Ellen S. Soffin, Note, The Case for a Federal
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege That Protects Patient Identity, 1985 DuKE L.J. 1217, 1224-
26 (1985) (contending that "the injury to the psychotherapist-patient relationship from
disclosing confidential communications far outweighs the incremental benefit such
communications can provide as courtroom evidence").
144 467 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1970).
145 See id. at 567. Although California had previously adopted a statutory
psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Court stated its belief
that a patient's interest in keeping such confidential revelations from public purview, in
retaining this substantial privacy, has deeper roots than the California statute and draws
sustenance from our constitutional heritage. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the United
States Supreme Court declared that various [constitutional] guarantees... create zones
of privacy, and we believe that the confidentiality of the psychotherapeutic session falls
within one such zone.
Id. See also Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976); Hawaii Psychiatric Soc. v.
Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1979); McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355
(D.N.J. 1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979); Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565
(E.D.N.Y. 1977); Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973); In re B, 394
A.2d 419 (Pa. 1978); Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976). All of these cases
acknowledge that psychotherapist-patient communications are protected to at least some extent
under a right to privacy.
146 See Lifschutz, 467 P.2d at 561-72 (limiting use of the privilege to the patient,
because only the intimate details of his life were at issue, and not those of the therapist, and
allowing the state to overcome that right where it could demonstrate a compelling interest,
narrowly tailored).
147 See Proposed Rules of Evidence and Advisory Committee's Notes, reprinted in
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-44 (1973)
(Proposed Rules); see also Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States
Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 366-69 (1971) (Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Rules).
148 The proposed rules suggested specific privileges concerning required reports
(Proposed Rule 502, 56 F.R.D. at 234-35), the lawyer-client relationship (Proposed Rule
503, id. at 235-40), the husband-wife relationship (Proposed Rule 505, id. at 244-47),
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protecting confidential information revealed by a patient to his or her
psychiatrist or psychologist from compulsory disclosure, 149 but pointedly did
not suggest protecting communications within the broader physician-patient
relationship. 150
When Congress adopted the final version of the new Federal Rules of
Evidence, however, it rejected the many specifically enumerated privileges in
the proposed rules in favor of a single rule authorizing federal courts to apply
"reason and experience" 151 in developing the right of privilege through
"principles of the common law." 152 The advisory committee notes explain that
communications to clergy (Proposed Rule 506, id. at 247-49), one's political vote (Proposed
Rule 507, id. at 249), trade secrets (Proposed Rule 508, id. at 249-51), secrets of state and
other official information (Proposed Rule 509, Id. at 251-54), and identity of informer
(Proposed Rule 510, id. at. 255-58), as well as the psychotherapist-patient relationship
(Proposed Rule 504, id. at 240-44).
149 Proposed Rule of Evidence 504 would have provided that:
A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing confidential communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment
of his mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, among himself, his
psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the
direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family.
Rule 504(b), Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
241 (1973).
150 See Advisory Committee's Note, Proposed Rule 504, 56 F.R.D. at 242 (stating that
"[t]he doubts attendant upon the general physician-patient privilege are not present when the
relationship is that of psychotherapist and patient. While the common law recognized no
general physician-patient privilege, it had indicated a disposition to recognize a
psychotherapist-patient privilege").
151 The phrase is taken from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26, which in tam
adopted the term from the opinion of Justice Harlan F. Stone in Wolfle v. United States, 291
U.S. 7, 12 (1934). The roots of the phrase, however, extend back much further. See Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in TiE PORTABLE THoMAs
JEFFERSON 552, 559 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975) ("Let us ... avail ourselves of our
reason and experience to correct the crude essays of our first and unexperienced, although
wise, virtuous, and well-meaning councils.") (emphasis added).
152 The rule adopted by Congress provides that:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions
and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
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"[i]t should be clearly understood that, in approving this general rule as to
privileges, the action of Congress should not be understood as disapproving any
recognition of a psychiatrist-patient, or husband-wife, or any other of the
enumerated privileges contained in the Supreme Court rules," 153 however, the
recognition of such privileges "should be determined on a case-by-case
basis." 154 The Supreme Court later held that Rule 501 directed federal courts to
"continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges," 155 and
offered that a new privilege could be carved out by the courts when it
"promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative
evidence in the administration of... justice,"1 56 thus suggesting a balancing
test not dissimilar from the one discovered under the Constitution in Whalen,
and rejecting the notion that the recognition of privileges should be fixed at any
single point in time.157
C. Jaffee v. Redmond: The Recognition of a Psychotherapist-Patient
Evidentiary Privilege
By 1994 all fifty states and the District of Columbia had adopted laws
recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 158 Despite this unanimity
among state legislatures, however, the federal courts responsible for developing
federal common law had become deeply divided on this issue, with the Second
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EvD. 501.
153 Id., Advisory Committee Notes.
154 Id.
155 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
156 Id. at 51.
157 Cf CARDOZO, supra note 113, at 19-20 (observing that "[e]xisting rules and
principles can give us our present location, our bearings, our latitude and longitude. [But the]
inn that shelters for the night is not the journey's end. The law, like the traveler, must be
ready for the morrow. It must have a principle of growth"); Warren & Brandeis, supra note
20, at 193 (perceiving that "[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of
new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of
society").
158 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 & n.11 (1996) (observing that all fifty
states and the District of Columbia have adopted a psychotherapist-patient privilege of some
sort); see also id. at 1931 & n.17 (noting that forty-five states and the District of Columbia
extend the privilege to communications with licensed clinical social workers as well as to
communications with psychiatrists and psychologists).
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and Sixth Circuits recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege, 159 while the
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits rejected such a privilege as
being inconsistent with those privileges previously recognized at common
law. 16o
1. Jaffee: Facts and Procedural History
On June 27, 1991, Mary Lu Redmond, then a police officer for the Village
of Hoffman Estates, Illinois ("Hoffman Estates"), responded to a dispatcher's
report of a fight in progress at the Grand Canyon Estates apartment complex.'
61
According to Redmond's testimony at trial, she saw two men run out of the
door of the apartment, with the latter, Ricky Allen, Sr., brandishing a butcher
knife and seemingly closing in on the former.' 62 After commanding Allen
several times to drop the knife, and believing that he was about to stab the man
he was chasing, Redmond shot and killed Allen.' 63
Allen's family took issue with Redmond's description of events, however,
contending that Allen was unarmed when he exited the apartment. 164 Allen's
mother, Carrie Jaffee, filed suit on behalf of his estate against respondents
Redmond and Hoffman Estates, alleging that Redmond had violated Allen's
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by using excessive and unwarranted
force, and seeking compensation for his wrongful death. 165
Through pretrial discovery, it was revealed that Redmond had participated
in approximately fifty counseling sessions with Karen Beyer, a licensed clinical
social worker (LCSW), commencing three to four days after the shooting and
continuing for about six months. 166 Plaintiffs sought access to Beyer's notes for
159 See In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.
1983).
160 See United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1994); Hancock v. Hobbs,
967 F.2d 462 (1lth Cir. 1992); United States v. Moore, 970 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1992); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1989); Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th
Cir. 1989).
161 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1925 (1996); Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d
1346, 1348 (7th Cir. 1995).
162 SeeJaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1925; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1348-49.
163 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1925-26; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1349.
164 SeeJaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1349.
165 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1348 (both noting that plaintiffs
filed suit for damages under REv. STAT. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for violating plaintiff-
decedent's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights) and Illinois Wrongful
Death Act, ILL. CON. STAT., ch. 740, § 180/0.01-2.2 (West 1994) (for causing plaintiff-
decedent's wrongful death)).
166 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1350.
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use in cross-examining Redmond at trial.167 Defendants refused to divulge the
notes, and contended that they were protected from compulsory disclosure at
either discovery or trial by a psychotherapist-patient privilege.' 68 The district
court instructed the jury to presume that the contents of the notes would have
been unfavorable to defendants. 169 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs
for $45,000 on the federal constitutional violation claim and $500,000 on the
state wrongful death claim. 170
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Circuit Judge John L.
Coffey, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. 171 The court held that
"reason and experience compel the recognition of a psychotherapist/patient
privilege." 172 However, it held that this privilege "requires an assessment of
whether, in the interests of justice, the evidentiary need for the disclosure of the
contents of a patient's counseling sessions outweighs that patient's privacy
interests" in the particular case at issue. 173 The court applied the balancing test
previously adopted by the Sixth Circuit1 74 and held that because "[t]here were
numerous eyewitnesses to the shooting... the plaintiffs' need for Officer
Redmond's personal innermost thoughts about the shooting incident were
cumulative at best. In contrast, Officer Redmond's privacy interests were, and
are still, substantial." 175
2. Jaffee: The United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court, per Justice Stevens, affirmed the court of appeals in
holding that the content of the conversations between Redmond and Beyer
during their counseling sessions was protected from compelled disclosure under
167 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1350.
168 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1350.
169 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1350-52.
170 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1352.
171 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1355-58.
172 See Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1355. The court observed the importance to a traumatized
patient of being able to seek out professional counseling in an environment of trust. See id. It
found that "[rieason tells us that psychotherapists and patients share a unique relationship, in
which the patient's ability to communicate freely without the fear of public disclosure is the
key to successful treatment." Id. at 1355-56. It also noted the counseling patient's privacy
interest. See id. at 1356-58.
173 See id. at 1357.
174 See id. at 1357-58 (quoting In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640 (6th Cir. 1983), in
stating that "we will determine the appropriate scope of the privilege 'by balancing the
interests protected by shielding the evidence sought with those advanced by disclosure'").
175 Id. at 1358.
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Rule 501.176 Although the Court acknowledged the time-honored maxim that
the public has a right to every person's evidence, 177 it also noted that an
exception to this rule was justified by a "public good transcending the normally
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the
truth."178 The Court held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege "serves the
public interest by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for
individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem. The mental
health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of
transcendent importance."1 79
The Court also observed that a balancing of competing interests strongly
favored recognizing the privilege. First, it found that the benefit to the cause of
justice that might result from denying the privilege was "modest" when
compared with the harm that would result from the chilling effect that the denial
of the privilege would have on confidential communications between
individuals in need of therapy and their psychotherapists. 180 Second, it noted
that all fifty states and the District of Columbia have recognized such a
privilege,' 8 ' but that this would have little of its intended effect of promoting
therapy if such a privilege was not likewise recognized in the federal courts.1 82
To fulfill this promise, the Court took the privilege a step further than the
176 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927-32. On remand, a jury awarded the victim's estate
$100,000 in damages on the constitutional violation claim, but cleared Redmond on the
wrongful death claim. See Michael Gillis, $100,000 Award in Shooting by Cop, Cm. SUN-
Tbm, Dec. 7, 1996, at 9.
177 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709
(1974); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
178 Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
179 Id. at 1929. The Court observed that effective psychotherapy
depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to
make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because
of the sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists,
disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling sessions may cause
embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may
impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful
treatment.... By protecting confidential communications between a psychotherapist and
her patient from involuntary disclosure, the proposed privilege thus serves important
private interests.
Id. at 1928-29 (footnote omitted).
180 See id. at 1929.
181 See id. at 1929 n.11.
182 See id. at 1929-30.
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Seventh Circuit had previously gone by rejecting the notion that such a
privilege should be contingent upon a trial judge's subsequent balancing of the
patient's privacy interest against the evidentiary need for disclosure. 183
Further, the Court held that the privilege protecting confidential
communications to psychotherapists should be extended to LCSWs as well as to
licensed psychiatrists and psychologists because LCSWs perform largely the
same counseling services as do psychiatrists and psychologists, and LCSWs
often service a client base of much more modest means. 184
The Court left open for future consideration the delineation of the "full
contours" of the privilege, 185 choosing not to render a decision that would
"govern all conceivable future questions in this area."18 6
Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, attacked the Court's recognition of the
privilege because, he asserted, the price society will have to pay for
encouraging psychotherapeutic counseling is that of occasional injustice, 187 and
moreover, the evil of "making our federal courts occasional instruments of
injustice."' 88 Although he appeared more willing to accept, at least in theory,
183 See id. at 1932 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981), in
observing that "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all"); cf. Smith,
supra note 143, at 48.
184 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931-32. It is unclear whether it was the Court's intention
to extend the privilege to Marriage, Family, and Child Counselors (MFCCs) as well as to
LCSWs, but following the Court's logic, which seems to vest the privilege in the nature of the
communication with the state-licensed professional rather than in the specific title of the
professional's license, it would seem that MFCCs, too, are covered by this privilege. Like
LCSWs, MFCCs service a broader segment of the population in terms of socio-economic
status than do psychiatrists and psychologists, and in contrast to LCSWs, who are trained as
clinicians in the context of managing a case, the professional scope and standard of practice of
MFCCs much more closely parallel that of psychologists, to whom the privilege seems to be
conceded even by Chief Justice Rehnquist (who joined Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent in
Jaffee only in Part III, which criticized the Court's application of the privilege to patient
communications with LCSWs).
185 See id. at 1932.
186 Id. at 1931 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386). The Court did not outline possible
exceptions to the privilege it was recognizing, but did acknowledge in a footnote that "we do
not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for example, if a
serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure
by the therapist," thus adopting sub silentio the dangerous patient exception first recognized
by the California Supreme Court in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d
334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932 n.19.
187 See id. at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 1934 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quipping that parents, siblings, best friends, and
bar tenders have all historically served a function in society similar to that of the
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the recognition of a privilege for licensed psychiatrists or psychologists, 189 he
vehemently took issue throughout his dissent with the extension of the privilege
to LCSWs. 190
IV. RULE 501 AND JAFFEE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RECOGNITION OF A
GENERAL PHYSIcIAN-PATIENT PRiVILEGE
A. Applying the Rationale of Jaffee to the Proposed Physician-Patient
Privilege
At some point in the next few years, the United States Supreme Court will
be asked to recognize a physician-patient privilege under Rule 501, in addition
to the psychotherapist-patient, 191 attorney-client, 192 and spousal1 93 privileges
that the Court has already recognized. Applying common law principles in light
of reason and experience in the same manner in which the Court applied them
in Jaffee, the Court should extend Rule 501 to protect a patient's medical
records and confidential communications with his or her physician from
compulsory disclosure.
First, reason tells us that the physician-patient evidentiary privilege is a
"public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all
rational means for ascertaining the truth." 194 The physical health and well-being
of all Americans is certainly a public good, and the physician-patient
relationship is one that promotes public health and well-being. However, the
threat of compelled public disclosure of one's personal medical information is
increasingly an important consideration that may serve to undermine this
psychotherapist, but do not enjoy an evidentiary privilege, and seemingly do not require one
to continue to effectively fulfill this role).
189 See id. at 1937 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia noted that a
licensed psychiatrist or psychologist is an expert in psychotherapy-and that may suffice
(though I think it not so clear that this Court should make the judgment) to justify the use
of extraordinary means to encourage counseling with him, as opposed to counseling with
one's rabbi, minister, family or friends.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190 See id. at 1932-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191 See id. at 1931-32.
192 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
193 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51-53 (1980).
194 Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
18491998]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURIVAL
relationship.' 95 Today, patient fears are justifiably greater in light of medical
advancements in determining sensitive information about a patient from a
patient's medical history, genetic code, and laboratory tests, 19 6 and are
compounded by technological developments that allow medical providers to
compile and disseminate this highly personal information with unprecedented
speed and efficiency. HIMOs and insurers in general have a tremendous
incentive to obtain medical information suggesting that an individual presents or
is likely in the future to present the risk of requiring costly health care, and
employers who provide health insurance plans for their employees are
vulnerable to pressure from insurers that wish to avoid providing services for
such individuals. The depersonalization of the physician-patient relationship, 197
the formalization of medical records, the compilation of such records into
computerized files, and especially the increasing interest that employers and
insurance companies are taking in such information all serve to validate patient
195 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 595 (1977) (noting that patients will
sometimes decline treatment out of fear of public disclosure and misinterpretation of sensitive
medical information).
196 See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17
(1989) (noting that blood and urine tests can reveal extensive information about an
individual's diet, health, neurological or physiological disorders, whether the individual is
pregnant, and what drugs (legal or illegal) he or she is taking). Various other tools, such as
positron-emission tomography (PET) scans, see, e.g., Benjamin V. Siegel et al., Regional
Cerebral Glucose Metabolism and Attention in Adults with a History of Childhood Autism, 4
J. NEURopsycIATRY & CLNICAL NEuRosCINcEs 406, 406-14 (1992); Alan J. Zametkin et
al., Cerebral Glucose Metabolism in Adults with Hyperactivity of Childhood Onset, 323 Naw
ENG. J. MED. 1361, 1361-66 (1990), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), see, e.g., Antonio
R. Damasio, Towards a Neuropathology of Emotion and Mood, 386 NATURE 769 (1997);
Wayne C. Drevets et al., Subgenual Prefrontal Cortex Abnormalities in Mood Disorders, 386
NATuRE 824 (1997), and cognitive science techniques, see, e.g., Debra L. Long et al., A Test
of the On-Line Status of Goal-Related Inferences, 31 J. MEmORY & LANGUAGE 634 (1992),
can even reveal the way in which an individual thinks-how, when, at what rate, and where
in one's brain the individual processes information.
197 In sharp ontrast to the enduring and often highly personal relationship that patients
often established with a single "family physician" only a generation or two ago, it is now
common for a patient belonging to an HMO plan to have only a very limited choice as to
whom his or her regular physician will be. Further, patients are now routinely referred from
one specialist to another and will rarely form more than the most superficial personal
relationship beyond the professional scope of the association. This breakdown in physician-
patient familiarity makes more formal safeguards protecting the confidentiality of the patient-
including a privilege for confidential communications-even more important if the patient is
going to be as forthright as he or she may need to be for the physician to appropriately
diagnose an existing problem or recognize immediate or long-term health risks to the patient
from the patient's symptoms, diet, activities, routine, or past consequential events.
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concerns about medical information confidentiality. 198 Several recent studies,
for instance, found that some six percent of 906 major American companies
surveyed perform genetic testing, and over twenty-five percent of those who
test "say they either won't hire or will fire a person who tests positive for
certain genetic traits." 199 Especially in an age when preventative health care is
becoming increasingly important, when every aspect of a person's life is now
recognized as having significant bearing upon his or her health, it is incumbent
upon society that it encourage frequent contact and full disclosure between
physician and patient. It also makes little sense to discourage individuals from
seeking health care at the time when their problems may be most treatable, and
instead induce them to wait until the condition of concern is so serious that the
threat of public disclosure is no longer an effective deterrent to the individual's
interest in seeking professional care.
Second, experience, too, favors recognition of the privilege by the federal
courts. Prior to the drafting of the proposed federal rules of evidence, the
American Hospital Association included a right to confidentiality in its
"Patient's Bill of Rights." 20° Today, the physician-patient evidentiary privilege
198 It should be emphasized that such testing already goes on today, often without the
patient's knowledge or consent. See, e.g., Dana Hawkins, A Bloody Mess at One Federal
Lab: Officials May Have Secretly Checked Staff for Syphilis, Pregnancy, and Sickle Cell,
U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., June 23, 1997, at 26 (reporting on secret testing program at
University of California's Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory).
199 CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast, June 22, 1997), transcript available
in 1997 WL 5613959. Another survey of human resources employees at 84 Fortune 500
companies found that one-third of the employees admitted having used medical or insurance
records in making decisions concerning hirings, promotions, or firings. See Steven Findlay,
Administration Today Offers Pkn to Ensure Confidentiality, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 1997, at
Al. A 7ime magazine article noted an instance in which a banker serving on a state health
commission obtained a list of cancer patients and subsequently revoked the loans of
individuals whose names appeared on the list. See Joshua Quittner, Invasion of Privacy,
Mflm, Aug. 25, 1997, at 28, 31.
200 See American Hospital Association, A Patient's Bill of Rights, reprinted in AmTAi
EzoNI, G'ENEC FIx 212 (1973) (suggesting that "It]he patient has the right to every
consideration of his privacy concerning his own medical care program .... The patient has
the right to expect that all communications and records pertaining to his care should be treated
as confidential"). Such protections, however, provide no real protections of patient
confidentiality. Consider, for example, a recently observed "Patient Bill of Rights" which
informed patients that "YOU ARE ENTITLED privacy concerning your medical care, including
examinations, consultations and discussions of your case. Facts and information about consultation,
examination, and treatment are considered confidential. Unless permitted by law, no information or
records pertaining to your care will be released without your written permission." Patient Bill of
Rights, posted in Kaiser Permanente Medical Center, Walnut Creek, Calif. (observed May
14, 1997) (emphasis added).
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is recognized by statute in a majority of states and the District of Columbia.201
Most of these state statutes are based on the American Law Institute's Uniform
Rule of Evidence 503 ("Uniform Rule 503"), a rule drafted in 1974 in response
to United States Supreme Court Standard 504 (Standard 504).202 Unlike
201 See supra note 7.
202 Uniform Rule 503 provides as follows:
Rule 503-Physician and Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
(a) Definitions. As used in this rle:
(1) A "patient" is a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a
physician or psychotherapist.
(2) A "physician" is a person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation,
or reasonably believed by the patient so to be.
(3) A "psychotherapist" is (i) a person authorized to practice medicine in any state
or nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis
or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, or,
(ii) a person licensed or certified as a psychologist under the laws of any state or nation,
while similarly engaged.
(4) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third
persons, except persons present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation,
examination, or interview, persons reasonably believed necessary for the transmission of
the communication, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment
under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist, including members of the
patient's family.
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made fbr the
purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his physical, mental or emotional condition,
including alcohol or drug addiction, among himself, his physician or psychotherapist,
and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the
physician or psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family.
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient, his
guardian or conservator, or the personal representative of a deceased patient. The person
who was the physician or psychotherapist at the time of the communication is presumed
to have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the patient.
(d) Exceptions.
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization. There is no privilege under this rule for
communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental
illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that
the patient is in need of hospitalization.
(2) Examination by order of court. If the court orders an examination of the
physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or a witness,
communications made in the course thereof are not privileged under this rule with
respect to the particular purpose for which the examination is ordered unless the court
orders otherwise.
(3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no privilege under this rule
as to a communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental[ ] or emotional
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an
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Standard 504, which applies only to psychotherapists, Uniform Rule 503
concerns both psychotherapists and physicians alike, and was designed to
protect the patient from the compulsory disclosure of confidential
communications not intended to be disclosed to third parties (except for those
present to further the interests of the patient) in the consultation, examination,
or treatment of the disorder.203 Consequently, as with the psychotherapist-
patient privilege prior to Jaffee, the reluctance of the federal courts to recognize
this privilege serves to undermine the promise made by the overwhelming
majority of states.
Thus, applying Rule 501 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Jaffee,
reason and experience both support the recognition of a physician-patient
privilege in federal courts.204
B. Scope of the Proposed Privilege
1. Exceptions to the Privilege
As with the psychotherapist-patient privilege recognized in Jaffee, a
physician-patient privilege would necessarily have to encompass some
exceptions. 20 5 Reason and experience suggest that the exceptions already
recognized by the states are an appropriate starting point for providing guidance
for the federal courts. There have been a number of exceptions specified under
.the various state statutes establishing physician-patient privileges. Uniform Rule
503, which has served as a model for many of the state statutes, provides for
exceptions where the communications in question are relevant to proceedings
for hospitalization, 206 where they result from an examination ordered by the
court,207 or where they are relevant to an issue relied upon by the patient as an
element of his or her claim or defense. 208 Other statutory exceptions apply to
element of his claim or defense or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which
any party relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.
UNt. R. EviD. 503, reprinted in 2 WEiNsmr & BERGER, supra note 9, § 5041[08], at 504-
36-37.
203 See id.
204 Cf Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929.
2 05 Upon recognizing that Rule 501 includes a physician-patient privilege, the Supreme
Court would presumably acknowledge that some exceptions as a general nile should exist,
and otherwise leave to the lower federal courts the task of determining, on a case-by-case
basis, where such exceptions should be drawn. See id. at 1932 & n. 19.
20 6 See UNF. R. EviD. 503(d)(1).
207 See id. 503(d)(2).
208 See id. 503(d)(3).
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communications where the information relates to an attempt to procure illegal
drugs,209 where the information relates to child abuse,210 where it is needed for
a disciplinary investigation of a physician,21' where the disclosure relates
directly to the facts or immediate circumstances of an alleged homicide,212
where the individual is being tested for intoxication or blood alcohol
concentration,21 3 and where the communications relate to a paternity
proceeding. 214 Additional exceptions, too numerous to list here, have been
carved out by the various state courts. This Note will not attempt here to
delineate those interests that are deserving of protection or those where
society's interests should predominate. However, although some exceptions are
clearly necessary, it is likewise true that if the courts recognize too many
exceptions, they will effectively undermine (if not wholly eviscerate) the
privilege's fundamental promise of granting the individual a sphere of personal
liberty with respect to an especially personal and private aspect of his or her
209 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.360 (1996); AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3407(C)
(Supp. 1996); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1017(2) (1976); D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-566 (1981).
This particular exception could have considerable ramifications for doctors who prescribe or
recommend marijuana for seriously or terminally ill patients. In response to the success of
voter initiatives in California (Proposition 215) and Arizona (Proposition 200, subsequently
overturned by the state legislature) supporting the legalization of marijuana for medicinal
purposes, Attorney General Janet Reno and other members of the Clinton administration have
proposed targeting physicians and patients who violate federal drug enforcement laws.
Compare Government Vows to Punish Doctors Who Prescribe Pot, ORLANDO SEMnNEL,
Dec. 31, 1996, at A5, available in 1996 WL 12437035 (reporting that federal law
enforcement authorities intend to enforce federal drug laws against physicians who prescribe
marijuana and patients who use it) with Jerome P. Kassirer, Federal Foolishness and
Maijuana, 336 NEw ENG. J. MED. 366, 366 (1997) (contending that "a federal policy that
prohibits physicians from alleviating suffering by prescribing marijuana for seriously ill
patients is misguided, heavy-handed, and inhumane" because the long-term side effects and
risk of addiction associated with marijuana are irrelevant to such patients, and deeming it
hypocritical for the government to ban marijuana when potentially lethal drugs such as
morphine and meperidine (Demerol) can be prescribed legally). In the absence of a clear
exception, a physician-patient privilege could conceivably be used (by the patient directly, or
by the physician on the patient's behalf) to prevent discovery of confidential communications
between the patient and physician concerning the usefulness and means of procurement of
marijuana.
210 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.060 (1996); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620
(1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-8 (Bums Supp. 1990); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 5.60.060 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.04(4)(e) (1993).
211 See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 329:26 (Supp. 1996); TEX. R. EvlD. 509(d)(5).
212 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 998-99; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.04(4)(d) (1993).
2 13 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.04(4)(f) (1993).
2 14 See id. at § 905.04(4)(g).
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life. Thus, if the federal courts do recognize a physician-patient privilege, they
should begin from the presumption that physician-patient communications are
privileged, and thereafter carefully distinguish on a case-by-case basis those
interests in which the state or an opposing party has a strong or compelling
interest in obtaining the disclosure, taking into consideration the conflicting
requirements of justice and privacy, state experiences with the various
privileges and exceptions, and, where applicable, consensus among the states
that such an exception should be recognized.
2. The Privilege as Applied to Compelled
Disclosure of Medical Records
Although Wigmore opposed the recognition of a physician-patient
privilege, he acknowledged its applicability to medical records where a general
privilege had been created by state statute. 215 Nevertheless, information
contained in an individual's medical records has traditionally played a crucial
role in helping judges and juries make determinations of guilt and damages in
criminal and civil suits. Today, while only a few of the state statutes
establishing physician-patient privileges explicitly protect medical records from
compelled disclosure, 216 many state courts have found that such records are
protected by the privilege. 217 A few federal court decisions have also
recognized a privilege for medical records.218 However, many of these
215 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 130, § 2382, at 839.
2 16 See Tax. R. EviD. 509(b)(2) (establishing that "[r]ecords of the identity, diagnosis,
evaluation or treatment of a patient by a physician that are created or maintained by a
physician are confidential and privileged and may not be disclosed"); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 905.04(2) (1993) (establishing that "[a] patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made or information
obtained or disseminated for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of the patient's physical,
mental or emotional condition") (emphasis added).
217 See, e.g., State v. Walker, 376 So.2d 92, 94 (La. 1979) (holding that a physician
may not disclose the patient's diagnosis without the latter's "epress consent"); State v.
O'Neill, 545 P.2d 97, 104 (Or. 1976) (extending privilege to physician's entries in hospital
records); Heinemann v. Mitchell, 220 N.E.2d 616, 617 (Ohio 1966) (finding that hospital
records that contain confidential communications are privileged). But see Chidester v.
Needles, 353 N.W.2d 849, 853-54 (Iowa 1984) (finding that confidential communication
privilege does not pertain to office records containing confidential communications sought
pursuant to subpoena filed by county attorney).
218 Me United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explicitly applied a
balancing test "weigh[ing] the need for truth against the importance of the relationship or
policy sought to be furthered by the privilege, and the likelihood that recognition of the
privilege will in fact protect that relationship in the factual setting of the case," Memorial
Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting
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privileges serve a primarily symbolic, rather than practical, purpose in their
effect as implemented. In civil suits, for instance, judges or juries awarding
damages based on life or work expectancy have traditionally taken into
consideration previously diagnosed diseases (including cancer, heart disease,
and other life-threatening illnesses) and factors that tend to predict premature
mortality (such as the use of drugs, alcohol, or cigarettes) in determining the
amount of the award.219 Blood and urine tests for alcohol or illegal drugs have
likewise consistently been admitted. 220 Many states have recognized specific
exceptions for HIV or substance abuse treatment records, but the underlying
rationale for these exceptions has been a general interest in protecting public
health rather than the individual interest in protecting confidentiality.
Ryan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 568 F.2d 531, 543 (7th Cir. 1977)), and has
argued that "[a] strong policy of comity between the state and federal sovereignties impels
federal courts to recognize state privileges where this can be accomplished at no substantial
cost to federal substantive and procedural policy" because "where a 'state holds out the
extetation of protection to its citizens, they should not be disappointed by a mechanical and
unnecessary application of the federal rule.'" Id. at 1061 (quoting United States v. King, 73
F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) and Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 576
(E.D.N.Y. 1977)). See also Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Phann. Corp., 90 F.R.D. 708 (E.D. Wis.
1981) (extending the state physician-patient privilege to the medical records of a patient's
family pursuant to Rule 501).
219 See Mark A. Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery of Pkdntiff Genetic Profiles by
Defendants Seeking to Limit Damages in Personal Injury Litigation, 71 IND. L.J. 877, 885-86
(1996).
220 See State v. Kavlich, 515 N.E.2d 652, 656 (Ohio App. 1986) (applying balancing
test in declining to apply physician-patient privilege to results of blood-alcohol level test
administered by defendant's physician in DUI prosecution); see also Vemonia School Dist.
47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2392 (1995) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit a school district from randomly drug testing its athletes); Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454-55 (1990) (noting the state's considerable interest in
eradicating drunk driving in permitting the use of police alcohol checkpoints); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (upholding government
program of conducting warrantless, suspicionless drag testing of United States Customs
employees in certain sensitive positions); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (permitting government's use of mandatory blood and nine tests of
employees, citing its compelling interest in railroad safety); id. at 628 ("[L]ogic and history
show that a diminished expectation of privacy attaches to information relating to the physical
condition of covered employees and to this reasonable means of procuring such
information."); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764-65 (1966) (holding privilege
against self-incrimination inapplicable to blood sample testing); Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633,
669 (Cal. 1994) (upholding NCAA drug testing program for collegiate athletes despite
recognized right to privacy in California); State ec rel. Allen v. Bedell, 454 S.E.2d 77, 81
(W. Va. 1994) (holding permissible the results of blood tests performed on the defendant by
treating physician). But see Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997) (holding
unconstitutional a drug testing requirement for candidates for political office).
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Consequently, where the evidentiary need is likewise presented as being in the
public interest, these exceptions are frequently overcome with little difficulty.221
Perhaps the only medical privilege that has had the practical effect of preserving
patient privacy is the Public Health Service Act,222 which protects research
subjects engaged in "biomedical, behavioral, clinical, or other
research ... including research on mental health," and specifically refers to the
privacy of the individual research subjects as the interest deserving
protection. 223
With regard specifically to medical records and genetic information-
"communications" within the physician-patient relationship that are especially
sensitive to damaging disclosure-this Note proposes as a general rule that the
compulsory disclosure of such information under the auspices of a federal court
should be limited to those circumstances where it is essential for the purposes of
establishing the identification of the suspected criminal wrongdoer or alleged
tortfeasor as the culpable party. Even then, the information an opposing party
may discover and disclose should be strictly limited to only that information that
is necessary to prove the identification of the defendant and his or her
association with the crime scene or unlawful event, and should exclude
information associated with genetically-inherited diseases whenever possible.
Moreover, the privilege should be based as much on protecting the patient's
interest in personal privacy as it is on a general societal interest. Information of
merely cumulative or tangential value should not be brought into public
consciousness unless the individual patient has somehow waived his or her right
to confidentiality over the information in question, for instance, where the
information relates directly to a ulaim or defense of the patient.
3. The Privilege as Applied to Genetic Testing
One subcategory of medical information-information derived from genetic
testing-is so sensitive and personal that it should be privileged from compelled
disclosure in all but the most exceptional cases or compelling circumstances.
Because this information may be crucial to the plaintiffs or state's case against
an individual, and due to the fact that the disclosure of such information in a
public record may expose an individual to social sanction and create difficulties
221 See Rothstein, supra note 219, at 902-04; see also Seth F. Kreiner, Sunlight,
Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional
Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 10 n.26 (1991); cf. Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 72
F.3d 1133, 1140 (3d Cir. 1995).
222 42 U.S.C. § 241(d) (1994).
223 See id.
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in obtaining health insurance,224 this subcategory is perhaps the most important,
complex, and controversial application of the proposed federal physician-patient
privilege.
The issue of whether to allow expert testimony regarding DNA evidence
has been litigated extensively, with most federal and state courts now
recognizing the validity of DNA evidence. 225 However, no federal court has
yet addressed the issue of whether reason and experience support the
recognition of a privilege for DNA evidence under Rule 501.226 This is
surprising because, especially in light of the progress being made by the
ongoing Human Genome Project, genetic information is already capable of
revealing some of the most sensitive and private information there is to know
about an individual, including predispositions for physical and psychiatric
disorders that may result in premature disability or even death.227 The potential
224 See Geoffrey Cowley, F7unk the Gene Test and Lose Your Insurance, NEWsVE ,
Dec. 23, 1996, at 48 (speculating on the potential for genetic testing to create a "'biological
underclass'-a population of people whose genes brand them as poor risks for employment,
insurance, even marriage"); see also Mark A. Rothstein, The Use of Genetic Information for
Nonmedical Purposes, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 109 (1994-1995); Mark A. Rothstein,
Discrimination Based on Genetic Infornation, 33 JulUMETmcs J. 13 (1992); Larry Gostin,
Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by
Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J. L. & MED. 109 (1991); Mark A. Rothstein, Employee
Selection Based on Susceptibility to Occupational Illness, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1379 (1983).
225 See, e.g., United States v. Black Cloud, 101 F.3d 1258 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that
DNA evidence met the criteria for admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as
established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharnaceutical, 509 U.S. 579 (1993));
Commonwealth v. Crews, 640 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1994) (finding that the random match
probability statistics offered by the prosecution's expert witness were not generally accepted
by the scientific community, but that a "more likely than not" characterization of a DNA
match was accepted); see also United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794, 796 (2d Cir.
1992) (citing United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (2d Cir. 1978), in finding
that DNA evidence met the relevancy standard set by Federal Rule of Evidence 403,
requiring the probative value to substantially outweigh the prejudicial, confusing, or
misleading effect, or cumulative nature, of the evidence; and that it met the standards of
Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 401 as well); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56
(8th Cir. 1990) (finding that DNA evidence was neither speculative nor conjectural, and thus
met both the expert opinion standard of Rule 702 and the "general acceptance" standard
recognized (prior to Daubert) in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)); cf
CARL SAGAN, CosMos 35 (1980) (observing that the number of useful DNA sequences is
"probably far greater than the number of electrons and protons in the universe").
226 Search of WESTLAW, ALLFEDS Database (Jan. 29, 1997).
227 As of July 1995, 1116 disease-related genes had been identified, including genes for
cystic fibrosis, Duchenne muscular dystrophy, fragile X syndrome, hemochromatosis,
hemophilia A, Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, neurofibromatosis-type 1, retinoblastoma, and
cancers of the breast, colon, ovaries, and prostate. See Rothstein, supra note 219, at 880-81.
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for such information to be exploited or misused by insurance companies is
enormous. 228 Nor is this danger limited to insurance companies. Defendants in
personal injury cases may seek to discover such information so as to limit
special damages based on lost future earnings.229 Although this approach would
be consistent with the notion that such damages should accurately reflect lost
future income, it also implicitly endorses the notion that society places a lesser
value on those individuals with certain genetic makeups-a dangerous step
toward eugenics. 230 Even more ominous still is the possibility that a criminal
prosecutor may some day use the defendant's possession of a gene statistically
associated with a propensity towards violence or even mere social
nonconformity to create a presumption in the jury's mind that the defendant is
The gene p53, in particular, has been associated with some sixty percent of all cancers. See
Sharon Begley, The Cancer Killer, NEwSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1996, at 42-47; see also Stephen
Aaron Silver, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Asperger's Syndrome: Extremes
on an Attention-Stimulation-lntegration Continuum Determined by Cognitive Structure 41-42,
89-93, 113 (1996) (unpublished M.A. thesis, John F. Kennedy University) (on file with
author) (noting studies suggesting a genetic cause for fragile X syndrome, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), autism, and Asperger's syndrome); Rothstein, supra, at 881
& nn.29-30 (noting that progress is being made in identifying genes related to heart disease,
diabetes, asthma, rheumatoid arthritis, schizophrenia, ADHD, and even bedwetting).
228 The incentive for HMOs and other insurance companies to use genetic testing to
curtail their rapidly escalating costs is clear. Genetic disorders occur in approximately three to
five percent of all live births in the United States and Britain, and chromosomal disorders like
Down's syndrome occur in an additional one-half percent. See KEvIES, supra note 125, at
291. About twenty to thirty percent of all pediatric hospital admissions, and twelve percent of
all adult hospital admissions, are attributable to genetic-based or chromosomal-based illnesses.
See id. About fifteen percent of all diagnoses for mental retardation are reported as being
"unambiguously hereditary." See id.; cf. Cowley, supra note 224, at 48 (reporting that an
entire family of six had their insurance cancelled when one member of the family was found
to have fragile X syndrome and speculating on the potential for genetic testing to create a
"biological underclass"); Rothstein, supra note 219, at 881-82 (stating that it may soon be
cost-effective for a defendant to test an asyniptomatic plaintiff for such already-identified
debilitating or deadly diseases as acute intermittent porphyria, adult polycystic kidney disease
type-I, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, early-onset Alzheimer's disease, familial nephritis,
Huntington's disease, Kennedy's disease, Marfan syndrome, myotonic dystrophy, hereditary
hemorrhagic telangiectasia, and Wilson's disease); Christine R. Kovach, Alzheimer's Disease:
Long-Term Care Issues, 12 Issum IN L. & MED. 47, 48 (1996) (reporting a 1992 estimate
that the cost of providing home care for dementia patients (including Alzheimer's disease
patients) is $25,259 per patient per year).
229 See Rothstein, supra note 219, at 884-87. See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Should
Genetic Information Be Used to Predict Life Expectancy of Plaintffs in Tort Cases?, 34
Hous. LAW. 49 (Sept.-Oct. 1996).
230 c f. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (stating that
"[distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon a doctrine of equality").
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guilty. 231 Such information can be manipulated far too easily by irresponsible
prosecutors, employers, or insurance companies to "legitimize" attitudes or
policies of intolerance. 232 Genetic tests can already be used to target specific
racial, ethnic, or religious groups associated with certain heritable traits, 233 and
23 1 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The JWispndence of Genetics,
45 VAND. L. REV. 313, 331 (1992) (warning that "[i]f it is accepted that genetic endowment
determines the propensity to commit bad acts, then hereditary traits, which often reduce to
ethnic group membership, may one day be considered evidence of the commission of a
crime"). Genetics may also influence the sentencing of an individual once convicted. One fear
is that
[c]ourts may regard an individual whom science deems "at risk" as deserving differential
treatment even before it is known whether the risk will materialize .... [P]eople
diagnosed as predisposed to hereditary disease may find themselves treated as if they
were carriers of disorders certain to achieve expression, even when the relationship
between genetic defects and their manifestations in behavior or disease is conditional.
Id. at 342. qy. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding state eugenics law because
"[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough"). The law approved in Buck remained in effect
until 1972. Several European countries, including Sweden and France, actively administered
eugenics programs until as recently as the mid-to-late 1970s and 1980s. See Mightline: The
Secret Shame (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 16, 1997); see also Editorial, Crimes Against
Genetics, 11 NAT. GENEr. 223, 224 (1995) ("I]he public... sees scientific information,
regardless of the soundness of the methods, as powerfully legitimizing, and, furthermore, the
public's perception of genetic findings is that they are immutable. Thus the mere perception of
reality... can provide impetus for the enactment of inequitable laws."). There is a
tremendous danger in attempting to use genetic or other biological characteristics
diagnostically based on a mere correlation with abnormal behavior, because such
characteristics need not always result in proscribed behavior and may even be associated with
normal or even exceptionally creative or productive personalities. C. DEAN KErI
SIMONTON, GREATNESS: WHO MAKES HISTORY AND WHY 284-311 (1994) (suggesting a link
between psychopathology and eminence); Silver, supra note 227, at 59-71, 133-36
(suggesting that ADHD may facilitate creative thought and that Asperger's syndrome may
likewise aid analytical thought); Dateline NBC: Natural Born Killers (NBC television
broadcast, July 20, 1997), transcript available in 1997 WL 7755158 (interview with
Professor Adrian Raine).
232 See, e.g., Stephen Jay Gould, Mismeasure by Any Measure, in THE BELL CURVE
DEBATE: HISTORY, DocuMENTs, OPINIONs 3, 7 (Russell Jacoby & Naomi Glauberman eds.,
1995) (criticizing a study purporting to show racial differences in heritable intelligence
because the authors "violate fairness by converting a complex case that can yield only
agnosticism into a biased brief for permanent and heritable difference").
233 It should be observed that there is so much genetic variation within racial, ethnic,
and national populations that, even where statistical sampling reveals significant genetic
distributional characteristics (such as ABO, Rh, and HLA allele frequencies) that distinguish a
population from other identifiable groups, see generally L.L. CAVALU-SFoRzA Er AL., THE
HiSTORY AND GEoGRAPHY OF HUMAN GENEs (1994); Gregory Livshits et al., Genetic
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may soon be able to identify other groups as well. 2 34 For some individuals, the
very threat of having such information publicly disclosed may prove tantamount
to extortion because the mere discovery of the information may cast a shadow
over the remainder of the patient's life, for instance, by making it impossible
for the individual to obtain health insurance. 235 Thus, reason and experience
justify an evidentiary privilege for DNA, at least where the state or party
Affinities of Jewish Populations, 49 AM. J. HUM. GE=-r. 131 (1991), these distributional
trends do not support the identification of individuals with any particular population.
Nevertheless, some specific genetic mutations are, as a result of natural selection or genetic
drift, disproportionately represented in certain populations. For example, the incidence of
sickle-cell anemia is disproportionately high among individuals of African descent,
thalassemia in persons of Southeast Asian and Philippino (c-type) and Greek, Italian, and
Asian (f -type) descent, Tay-Sachs disease in Ashkenazi Jews and French Canadians, and
idiopathic torsion dystonia, Gaucher disease, and the BRCA1 breast cancer gene in Ashkenazi
Jews. See generally SICKLE CELL DISEAsE: BAsic PPiNCIPLES AND CLINICAL PRAICE
(Stephen H. Embury et al. eds., 1994); GENEIC DzAmss AMONG AsHKENAZI JEws
(Richard M. Goodman & Arno G. Motulsky eds., 1979); Josie Glausiusz, Unfortunate Drift,
16 DISCOVER 34 (1995); Amo G. Motulsky, Jewish Diseases and Origins, 9 NAT. G=r.
99 (1995); Jeffery P. Struewing et al., The Carrier Frequency of the BRCA1 185deL4G
Mutation is Approximately I Percent in Ashkenazi Jewish Individuals, 11 NAT. G=NET. 198
(1995); Yuet Wai Kan, Development of DNA Analysis for Human Diseases: Sickle Cell
Anemia and Thalassemia as a Paradigm, 267 JAMA 1532, 1532 (1992); Brian W. Jack &
Larry Culpepper, Commentary, Preconception Care: Risk Reduction and Health Promotion
in Preparation for Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 1147, 1149 (1990). Furthermore, there are certain
mutations that are found especially frequently and almost exclusively within particular
populations. For instance, distinct ethno-specific nucleotide changes characterize the most
prevalent BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations found within each of the respective Russian,
Jewish, Italian, Franco-British, Dutch, Swedish, African-American/African-French,
Japanese, Finnish, and Icelandic populations. See Csilla I. Szabo & Mary-Claire King,
Population Genetics of BRCA1 and BRCA2, 60 AM. J. HuM. G=NT. 1013 (1997). The
testing for these and other genes associated with certain ethnic, ethno-religious, or otherwise
identifiable groups could thus be used as a "facially neutral" shield for an underlying policy of
otherwise impermissible discrimination, thereby giving it a veneer of legitimacy. See KEVLE,
supra note 125, at 299 (noting the danger that "the definition of 'defect' might become once
again a hereditarian cloak for social prejudice"). Even within groups there exists the threat of
using genetics as a "legitimacy test." A recent article in the New York 7Tmes reporting that
many cohanim-Jews of patrilinear priestly descent-share distinctive genetic markers also
noted the danger that such information could be used by religious extremists for exclusionary
purposes. See Denise Grady, Genetic Traces Are Found to Link Descendants of Jewish
Priesthood, N.Y. TnMEs, Jan. 7, 1997, at B12.
234 For example, sexual orientation, see Rothstein, supra note 219, at 881 n.30,
propensity for obesity, see Michael Rosenbaum et al., Medical Progress: Obesity, 337 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 396, 401-02 (1997), and predisposition for addiction or addictive behavior, see
Nora D. Volkow et al., Decreased Stratial Dopaminergic Responsiveness in Detoxified
Cocaine-Dependent Species, 386 NATURE 830 (1997), may all be genetically based.
235 See supra notes 125, 224, 228.
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seeking the disclosure cannot show a serious or compelling interest in the
information and where the information to be disclosed cannot be limited to the
minimum amount of information necessary to match a suspected felon or
tortfeasor to the criminal or tortious event. Rules of evidence exist to facilitate
the accurate determination of facts in controversy; they do not provide parties
with an open forum in which to disclose whatever information a party contends
will support its cause-especially where the information is merely cumulative in
effect and potentially oppressive to one of the parties.
The recently enacted Kennedy-Kassebaum Bill,236 which was intended
primarily to make health insurance more accessible to individuals who lose their
jobs or have pre-existing medical conditions, may in fact pose a further threat to
the medical privacy of individuals. To "improve... the efficiency and
effectiveness of the health care system"-for example, by improving health care
for individuals who are away from their regular hospitals or doctors-it will
create a national computer network that will permit health care companies to
transmit records electronically. 237 At a minimum, the mere existence of such a
database creates the potential for intentional or inadvertent disclosure of highly
sensitive information. 238 It also does little to protect individuals whose genetic
history may reveal a predisposition for certain inherited diseases. 239 The
2 36 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 [hereinafter
HIPAA], Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 STAT. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996).
2 37 Id. §§ 261-62. The Bill requires doctors to make available "any information,
whether oral or recorded in any form or medium," presumably including the doctor's
confidential notes and communications. Id. § 262(a)(4); cf. John Schwartz, WAsH. PosT,
Aug. 4, 1996, at A23 (noting that there is no consent requirement for a patient's records to be
made available on the electronic database, and quoting Denise Nagel of the National Coalition
for Patients' Rights as expressing fear that the ready availability of "cradle-to-grave-records"
could affect the individual's future prospects for obtaining employment or insurance, and
thereby lead people to become less apt to seek health care when they need it).
238 Although HIPAA does establish penalties for some transfers of personal information,
the very existence of such a database is per se a threat, as experience has shown. See, e.g.,
Sue Landry, AIDS List Is Out: State Investigating Breach, ST. PEnmsBURG TIMEs, Sept. 20,
1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 11941560 (noting the leaking of a confidential list of 4000
people with AIDS maintained at a county health unit).
239 Although the Kennedy-Kassebaum Bill will prevent the charging of higher premiums
or the denial of coverage on account of genetic history by insurance companies, these
restrictions protect only those individuals in group health insurance plans, and do not extend
to people in individual plans. See K.C. Swanson, New Test, New Concerns, NAT'L J., Jan. 4,
1997, available in 1997 WL 7227937, at *5-6. Nor, for that matter, are insurance companies
prevented from raising their rates on entire groups, which may lead to the denial of coverage
through indirect pressures on employers. See id. at *6. Further, an individual making any
kind of anti-discrimination claim would have to surrender his or her privacy, which could
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Kennedy-Kassebaurn Bill also requires Congress to enact legislation protecting
certain health information.24° The Secretary of Health and Human Services has
just released official recommendations pursuant to the Act.241 These
recommendations would provide significant substantive protections for patient
health information where the patient is not a party to the proceeding, 242 but
would provide no additional substantive protections where the patient is a
party.243 Two bills proposed in Congress last year would have provided greater
protections for the patient's privacy, particularly with regard to the electronic
communication of medical records, but neither bill was called up for a vote.244
potentially lead to difficulties obtaining a job or insurance elsewhere in the future, thus
deterring him or her from ever filing suit. See id. at *8.
240 See HIPAA, supra note 236, § 264(c)(2). If Congress fails to act within 36 months,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services will be required to issue regulations within 42
months of the enactment of HIPAA. See id. § 264(c)(1).
241 See Confidentalty of Individualy-Indentfiable Health Information:
Recommendations of the Secretary of Health and Hwnan Services, Pursuant to Section 264 of
the Health Insurance Portability andAccountability Act of 1996, available in <http://aspe.os.
hhs.gov/admnsimp/pvcrecO.htm>.
242 Where the patient is not a party to the proceeding:
We recommend that providers and payers be permitted to disclose health information in
a judicial or administrative proceeding (other than a proceeding in which the patient is a
party and has put his or her condition at issue), pursuant to an administrative or judicial
subpoena if the patient has been notified in advance and has not objected in a timely
manner.
We recommend that if the patient has been notified in advance and does object in a
timely manner, the official issuing the subpoena not order the information disclosed
unless the person seeking the information has demonstrated that
-there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information will be relevant to
the proceeding; and
-the need for the information outweighs the privacy interest of the patient.
We recommend that in determining whether the need for the information outweighs the
privacy interest of the patient, the court or agency consider
-- the particular purpose for which the information was collected;
-the degree to which disclosure of the information will embarrass, injure, or
invade the privacy of the patient;
-the effect of the disclosure on the patient's health care;
-- the importance of the information to the lawsuit or proceeding; and
-any other factor deemed relevant by the court.
We recommend that a covered entity be permitted to challenge a demand for health
information on any grounds available under this or other law.
Id. at Part II.E.12.
2 43 See id. at Part I.E.11.
244 See H.R. 3482, 104th Cong. (1996) (sponsored by Rep. McDermott (D-Wash.)); S.
1360, 104th Cong. (1996) (co-sponsored by Sens. Bennett (R-Utah) and Leahy (D-Vt.)).
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Similar bills have been proposed recently, 245 one of which has been endorsed
by President Clinton.246
V. CONCLUSION
It is an aphorism of American jurisprudence that without personal liberty,
there can be no justice.247 And if there is one lesson to be garnered from
"reason and experience," it is that liberty exists only insofar as people can act
with the advance expectation of privacy.248 With regard to physician-patient
245 See H.R. 306, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Rep. Slaughter (D-N.Y.)); H.R.
328, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Rep. Solomon (R-N.Y.)); H.R. 341, 105th Cong.
(1997) (sponsored by Rep. Stearns (R-Fla.)); H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by
Rep. McDermott (D-Wash.)); S. 89, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Sen. Snowe (R-
Me.)); S. 422, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Sen. Domenici (R-N.M.)).
246 See Whute House Calls [Flor Immediate Action on Slaughter Bill (Gov't Press
Release, July 14, 1997), reprinted in 1997 WL 12100999.
247 As Justice Stevens once noted, the Constitution as interpreted "presumes that it is far
better to permit some individuals to make incorrect decisions than to deny all individuals the
right to make decisions that have a profound effect upon their destiny." Thomburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 781 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (noting that
"because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist
that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly"); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891) (contending that "[n]o right is held more sacred... than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law"). The First
Amendment right to free speech, for instance, embodies one of this country's most
fundamental ideals-that of open debate and free expression. In times of crisis, however,
courts have tended to abridge this right in favor of expediting judicial sanction, thereby
chilling the exercise of this right. Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
(upholding conviction for advocacy of future seditious activity at height of "Red Scare") with
Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in THm PORTABLE THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 151, at 290, 292 (stating that "[i]f there be any among us who would
wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as
monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left
free to combat it").
248 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844
(1992) ("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."); Public Utilities Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The right to be let alone is
indeed the beginning of all freedom."); Arthur J. Goldberg, Can We Afford Liberty?, 15
AKRON L. Rpv. 1, 3 (1981) ("Individual rights cannot exist in the absence of individual
privacy .... ."); David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in
Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 110 (1956) ("inhere are things even more
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communications, reason tells us that information concerning an individual's
health "is perhaps the most intimate, personal, and sensitive of any information
maintained about an individual. '249 And when the needs of individual privacy
and societal justice collide, experience tells us that we should err on the side of
privacy-that we should strive to leave as much of a person's life to his or her
own conscience as society can rationally bear.25 0 The United States Supreme
Court's rationale in Jaffee suggests that, where a privilege serves a public good
of transcendent importance, where the benefits of granting the privilege
outweigh the relatively modest value such information might have as evidence,
and where there is near unanimity among the states that such a privilege is
justified, reason and experience support the recognition by federal courts of an
evidentiary privilege. The federal courts should apply this reasoning to
recognize a general physician-patient privilege as well. The extension of Jaffee
to the physician-patient relationship and medical records, including genetic
testing, would affirm the basic dignity of the human being, and reassure the
individual of his or her right to an essential sphere of privacy from
governmental observation or public disclosure in which he or she can honestly
and openly seek medical assistance. Where the individual takes the affirmative
step of seeking preventative health care, and even more so where a medical
condition or genetic predisposition posing a direct threat to the individual's life
or health compels him or her to obtain medical services, it is essential for the
individual to be able to seek consultation, diagnosis, and treatment without fear
of unwarranted disclosure. In all but the most compelling circumstances, this
interest in personal privacy outweighs the modest evidentiary benefit it may
provide the party seeking the disclosure. Nearly all states have reached this
decision, either through their legislatures or in their courts. Thus, according to
the standards established by the Supreme Court in Jaffee, reason and experience
important to human liberty than accurate adjudication. One of them is the right to be left by
the state unmolested in certain human relations.").
249 Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Privacy and Security of Personal Information in a New
Health Care System, 270 JAMA 2487, 2487 (1993).
250 In the words of Lewis Mayers:
Is it not hard to justify in a free society the exertion of naked power by which a private
citizen is with such dubious necessity singled out and compelled against his will to make
damaging disclosures regarding his own private affairs .... [F]ar from withdrawing or
in any way limiting his privilege against self-incrimination, there is much to be said for
enlarging his privilege of silence, excusing him from making disclosures which, though
not criminatory, are likely to be injurious to him.
LEwis MAYERs, SHALL WE AMEND THE F)FiH AimMsm? 132-33 (1959), quoted in
Erwin N. Griswold, The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 216, 220-21 (1960).
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clearly support the federal courts' recognition of a physician-patient
confidentiality privilege under Rule 501, and its affirmation of human dignity
and personal privacy. Our system of justice in the context of a free society
demands nothing less.
